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COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE LEGAL AND
REGULATORY PROTECTIONS FOR CUSTOMER
MARGIN IN THE U.S. DERIVATIVES MARKETS
CHRISTIAN CHAMORRO-COURTLAND*
ABSTRACT
This Article provides a detailed analysis of the laws and
regulations that applyto margin postedbycustomers entering into
futures and cleared swaps contracts in the United States. It de-
scribes the types ofmargin accounts used byFutures Commission
Merchants (FCM) and Central Counterparties (CCPs). It ana-
lyzes the rights ofcustomers upon the insolvencyoftheir FCM.
First, this Article explains why futures customers currently
receive a lower levelofprotection under the CommodityExchange
Act than that received byclearedswaps customers under the Dodd-
Frank Act. On the one hand, futures customers currently share
risk as co-owners for margin that they post (the Futures Model), 
which exposes them to fellow customer risk. On the other hand, 
the Dodd-FrankAct protects cleared swaps customers from fellow
customer riskbyprohibiting CCPs from using the margin ofnon-
defaulting customers ofan insolvent FCM (the LegalSegregation
and Operationally Commingled Model, or the LSOC Model). 
This Article argues that the different levelofprotection received
byfutures customers and cleared swaps customers is unjustified
because the statutorylanguage suggests that theyshould receive
the same treatment in an insolvencysituation. There are also many
benefits to adopting the LSOC Modelin the futures markets;
therefore, the LSOC Modelshould replace the Futures Modelin
the futures industryin order to eliminate fellow customer riskfor
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futures customers. It also considers the ramifications ofthis change
andrecommends how to implement this new approach.
Second, it recommends that mandatory insurance should be
used to protect futures and cleared swaps customers against losses
resulting from fraud and other operationalrisks. This would
increase the levelofcustomer protection and confidence in the
U.S. derivatives markets. These changes should enhance legalcer-
taintyduring the next financialcrisis and allow regulators and
the courts to speedilyallocate losses andtransfer or return margin
to customers. Finally, it compares the U.S. approach for protecting
customer margin with the approach in the U.S. securities mar-
kets and other jurisdictions that have large derivatives markets.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent insolvencies of three1 major Futures Commission
Merchants (FCMs)2 in the United States has raised the issue of
the level of protection3 that the law provides to the margin4 de-
posits of customers that have their contracts cleared through a
Central Counterparty (CCP).5 Futures customers who deposit
margin with a U.S. clearing member (CM)6 currently receive a
lower level of protection than cleared swaps customers because
two different segregation models are used.7
1 Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy under the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code on September 15, 2008, MF Global filed on October 31, 2011,
and Peregrine Financial Group filed on July 10, 2012. Cash In The PerilAt
The CCPS, COOCONNECT PEER GRP. NETWORK (2013), http://cooconnect.com
/online-magazine/cash-peril-ccps [https://perma.cc/SFY3-SJA4] [hereinafter
COOCONNECT].
2 An FCM is the analogue in the futures industry to broker-dealers in the 
securities industry. Jerry W. Markham, CustodialRequirements for Customer
Funds, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 92, 93 (2013).
3 The truth is that, until MF Global exposed the inadequacy of existing 
protections, clients assumed that their collateral was protected by the CCP, and
that they had no exposure to clearing brokers.... [W]hat happens to cash and
securities belonging to customers when a clearing broker or CCP, or even a
trading counterparty of a clearing broker or CCP, defaults? COOCONNECT,
supra note 1.
4 This term is used interchangeably with collateral. 
5 A CCP clearing system is a sui generis financial risk management 
institution that operates by interposing itself between a group of merchants,
known as clearing members, who have contractually entered into the CCP
scheme in order to clear financial transactions they had previously initiated.
The clearing process gives rise to rights and obligations between the clearing
members and the CCP. Christian Chamorro-Courtland, The Trillion Dollar
Question: Can a CentralBankBailOut a CentralCounterpartyClearing House
which is Too Big To Fail?, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 433, 435 (2012)
[hereinafter Chamorro-Courtland, The Trillion Dollar Question]. The clearing
arrangement affects the rights of customers that use a CM to access the CCP. Id.
6 An FCM can be a direct or an indirect clearing member of a CCP. See
Chamorro-Courtland, The Trillion Dollar Question, supra note 5, at 459. This
Article assumes that FCMs are direct clearing members and therefore uses the
terms FCM and CM interchangeably. 
7 Segregation is defined as a method of protecting customers collateral 
and contractual positions by holding and accounting for them separately
from those of their clearing member and fellow customer of their clearing
member. CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS, DERIVATIVES: SEGREGATION
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This Article focuses on the main segregation models used
to protect the margin deposits of futures and cleared swaps cus-
tomers (collectively known as derivative8 or commodity con-
tracts).9 These customers currently receive different treatment
under U.S. law. There is legal uncertainty because the laws for
protecting customer margin and the practices of CCPs have de-
veloped in a piecemeal fashion.
Futures customers who clear their contracts with a CCP in
the United States receive a lower level of protection under the
Futures Model for segregating customer margin than is intended
by the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).10 These customers are
exposed to fellow customer risk in a double default situation.
A double default occurs where one or more customers default 
on their obligations to the CM, and the losses are so large that it
causes the CM to default on its obligations to the CCP.11 This could
AND PORTABILITY IN OTC DERIVATIVES CLEARING CANADIAN SECURITIES
ADMINISTRATORS COMMITTEE, CSA CONSULTATION PAPER 91-404 3 (Feb. 10,
2012) [hereinafter CSA CONSULTATION PAPER].
8 Derivatives are financial products that derive their value from the value 
of assets traded in other markets. 3 JAN DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON TRANS-
NATIONAL COMPARATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW 256 (5th ed.
2013). They are contracts that allow the efficient management and transfer-
ence of risk to another party in exchange for a premium. ANDREW M. CHISHOLM,
DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO FORWARDS, FUTURES,
SWAPS AND OPTIONS 56 (2d ed. 2010). Contracts are mere personalrights that
confer rights, carry obligations, and award damages if breached.
9 Section 724(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act clarifies that cleared swaps are
commodity contracts within the meaning of § 761(4)(F) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Customer collateral is protected by subchapter IV of Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code and Commission Regulation Part 190. COMMODITIES FU-
TURES TRADING COMMN, Q & APROTECTION OF CLEARED SWAPS CUSTOMER
CONTRACTS AND COLLATERAL, http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@news
room/documents/file/sb_qa.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UJP-SJRY].
10 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2015); Christian Chamorro-
Courtland, CollateralDamage: Adopting the LSOC Modeland Insurance in
the US Futures Markets, COLUM. L. SCH. BLOG ON CORPS. & CAPITAL MKTS.
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/10/02/collateral-dam
age-adopting-the-lsoc-model-and-insurance-in-the-us-futures-markets/ [https://
perma.cc/J4KY-GDST] [hereinafter Chamorro-Courtland, CollateralDamage].
11 COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMN, Q & AFINAL RULES ENHANC-
ING PROTECTIONS AFFORDED CUSTOMERS AND CUSTOMER FUNDS HELD BY FU-
TURES COMMISSION MERCHANTS AND DERIVATIVES CLEARING ORGANIZATIONS,
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lead to fellow customer risk, which occurs if the CCP uses the 
margin of the non-defaulting customers of an insolvent CM to
cover the obligations of the defaulting customers.12
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has
noted that
[u]nder the current rules applicable to futures clearing, a
[Derivatives Clearing Organization (DCO)]13 is permitted
to use all of the collateral in the Clearing Members customer 
account to meet a loss in that account, without regard to
which customer(s) in fact supplied that collateral. Thus, in
this case, the non-defaulting customers of the defaulting FCM
clearing member would be exposed to loss due to Fellow-
Customer Risk.14
Consequently, the Futures Model exposes non-defaulting cus-
tomers of [an] FCM in the same customer account class as the
defaulting customer to a pro rata portion of any deficiency in that
account class.15
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/custprot_qa
_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XXK4-9S2E].
12 See LINKLATERS, CFTC ADOPTS LSOC MODEL FOR PROTECTION OF
CLEARED SWAPS CUSTOMERS MARGIN, MARKING A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE
FROM THE TRADITIONAL U.S. FUTURES MODEL 1 (Jan. 2012), http://www.link
laters.com/pdfs/mkt/newyork/A14488988.pdf.
13 A CCP that clears futures and cleared swaps contracts is referred to as a
Derivatives Clearing Organization under U.S. law. This Article uses the terms
DCO and CCP interchangeably. See Chamorro-Courtland, The Trillion Dol-
lar Question, supra note 5, at 462.
14 Protection of Cleared Swaps Customer Contracts and Collateral; Con-
forming Amendments to the Commodity Broker Bankruptcy Provisions, 77
Fed. Reg., 6336, 6339 (Feb. 7, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 22, 190)
[hereinafter CFTC REPORT] (emphasis added). See also COMMODITIES FUTURES
TRADING COMMN, supra note 9. This market practice has been expressed in
CMEs rulebook: If a default occurs in a customer futures account, the Clear-
ing House has the right to liquidate and apply toward the default allopen po-
sitions and customer performance bond deposits in the futures account class
of the defaulting clearing member. Accordingly, positions andperformance bonds
deposited bycustomers not causing the default are at risk if there is a default
in the futures account class of their clearing member. CME GRP., NYMEX
RULEBOOK: RULE 802.G.1 (current as of June 1, 2015), https://www.cmegroup
.com/rulebook/NYMEX/1/8.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7Y2-G56P] [hereinafter CME
RULEBOOK] (emphasis added).
15 LINKLATERS, supra note 12, at 1.
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Under the Futures Model of segregation, CCPs hold futures
customer margin in an omnibus account16 on a collective basis 
and deliberately ignore the identity of individual customer mar-
gin deposits.17 This practice has allowed CCPs to take advantage
of a loophole in the Bankruptcy Code and escape from the require-
ments of the CEA: first, it allows CCPs to access the margin of
non-defaulting customers as a part of the default waterfall;18
second, it requires futures customers to share any losses in the col-
lective account on a pro rata basis.19
In response to this practice, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Act (DFA)20 after the 2008 financial crisis. It amended the CEA,
inter alia, to provide cleared swaps21 customers with protection
from fellow customer risk. The CFTC has adopted the Legal Seg-
regation and Operationally Commingled (LSOC) Model of seg-
regation, which prohibits the CCP and the CM from using the
margin of non-defaulting customers to cover the losses of any
defaulting customers.22
Linklaters has noted that
[t]he LSOC Model differs from the traditional futures ap-
proach ... in how it handles Double Defaults.... Under the LSOC
model, a DCO facing a Double Default cannot apply the prop-
erty of non-defaulting swap customers of the defaulting FCM
to satisfy such a deficiency, but rather must look only to the
property of the defaulting customer and other available finan-
cial resources (e.g., assets of the defaulting FCM, its own eq-
uity, the guaranty fund or unfunded assessments). Conversely,
under the current futures model, if a Double Default were to
occur, the DCO would have recourse to the property of any
16 An omnibus account is a single account where the margin of multiple 
customers is commingled and held at an FCM, a CCP, or at a depository. See
Chamorro-Courtland, CollateralDamage, supra note 10.
17 Id.
18 The default waterfall is the list of available resources that a CCP has to
cure a default by the CM. See id.
19 Id.
20 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 376 (2010).
21 The market for non-cleared swaps is outside the scope of this Article.
22 LINKLATERS, supra note 12, at 1.
2016] U.S. DERIVATIVES MARKETS 617
customers of the FCM in the same account class, including
non-defaulting customers.23
The new law requires CCPs to record and identify individual 
swaps customer margin deposits on a daily basis.24 In these situ-
ations, the non-defaulting customers will not be affected in a
double default situation, because the Bankruptcy Code requires
the CCP to transfer or return any identifiable margin to the 
non-defaulting customers.25
This Article will clarify the purpose of derivative markets
legislation in the United States, which has not been adequately
addressed in the legal literature. The debate revolves around allo-
cating a finite amount of resources in an emergency situation, i.e.,
protecting customer margin versus the CCPs default waterfall. 
Whereas the Futures Model places the margin of non-
defaulting futures customers of an insolvent FCM at the top of
the CCPs default waterfall, the LSOC Model removes the margin
of cleared swaps customers from the CCP default waterfall alto-
gether. In sum, the basic difference between the [LSOC] Model 
and the Futures Model thus relates to a difference in the alloca-
tion of loss arising out of a double default of both a customer and
the customers FCM.26
It is unjust that customers receive a different level of protec-
tion, since the CEA and DFA expressly prohibit CCPs and FCMs
from using the margin of one customer to cover the contractual
obligations of another customer that holds margin in the same
omnibus account.27
This Article will demonstrate that the CEA contains language
suggesting that futures customers should also receive protection
under the LSOC Model. As a result, the LSOC Model should be
adopted in the U.S. futures markets. This would provide futures
customers with enhanced protection to match the level of protec-
tion provided to cleared swaps customers. Additionally, this Ar-
ticle recommends introducing mandatory insurance to protect
23 Id. at 3.
24 Chamorro-Courtland, CollateralDamage, supra note 10.
25 Id.
26 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6364.
27 Id. at 6367.
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both futures and cleared swaps customers from fraud and other
operational risks.
A. Scope andLegalIssues
The scope of this Article is limited to margin posted by futures
and cleared swaps customers.28 It focuses exclusively on the Fu-
tures Model and the LSOC Model for segregating customer mar-
gin.29 It examines the legal theory and clarifies areas of ambiguity.
Moreover, it attempts to provide answers to the following legal
issues: What is the best model for holding customer margin? Who
does the margin belong to in an insolvency situation? What hap-
pens if there is shortfall in margin? What rights does the CCP
have against the customer margin in a double default situation
under its default waterfall? What are the legal characteristics of
an omnibus account? Why is there a different level of protection
being provided to futures and cleared swaps customers despite
the similar statutory language?
B. Futures and ClearedSwaps
A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell an asset at 
an agreed future moment for a fixed price, often the present mar-
ket price (or relevant index).30 These contracts are purchased
and sold on organized futures exchanges. They are used by mar-
ket participants as risk-shifting mechanisms that deal in rights
and promises independent of the underlying asset.31 Most par-
ticipants will close out their positions before the maturity date in
order to avoid taking delivery of the underlying asset.32
28 This Article does not focus on the margin that is posted by a CM to support
its own proprietary positions.
29 Although the CFTC considered various other models for protecting
customer margin, such as Legal Segregation with Recourse Model, the Full 
Physical Segregation Model, and the Optional Model, it determined after a 
cost-benefit analysis that none of the models provided customers with a better
level of protection than LSOC; therefore, these models are not discussed fur-
ther in this Article. CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6339, 6345.
30 DALHUISEN, supra note 8, at 256.
31 MAREK DUBOVEC, THE LAW OF SECURITIES, COMMODITIES AND BANK
ACCOUNTS: THE RIGHTS OF ACCOUNT HOLDERS 160 (2014).
32 Id. at 16061. 
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A swap contract does not in itself denote any particular legal 
structure except some kind of exchange. In modern finance, it is
common to find an exchange of accruing cash flows, normally re-
sulting from different interest rate (fixed or floating) structures.33
These contracts, which include interest rate swaps, currency
swaps, and credit default swaps, were mainly traded over-the-
counter (OTC) before the 2008 financial crisis.34 The DFA has
imposed a mandatory clearing requirement on standardized swaps
(cleared swaps), as will be discussed below.
C. Literature Review
Various articles and reports have considered the current legal
regime for the protection of customer margin in the derivatives
markets.35 First, this Article updates and expands on research con-
ducted by the Supervisors of the Major OTC Derivatives Dealers,
which published a detailed report on margin segregation in 2009.36
Their report provided a detailed comparative analysis on the treat-
ment of customer initial margin upon the insolvency of a CM in
five different jurisdictions.
Second, this Article elaborates on issues discussed in the
CFTCs report on the Protection of Cleared Swaps Customer 
Contracts and Collateral (CFTC Report).37 Although the report
confirms that futures customers receive a weaker level of protec-
tion than cleared swaps customers, it does not provide a convinc-
ing justification for this distinction.
Third, the discussion expands on some of the legal issues dis-
cussed by Professor Jerry W. Markham in his article Custodial
Requirements for Customer Funds.38 He argued, inter alia, that
33 DALHUISEN, supra note 8, at 257.
34 Id. at 25253, 277. 
35 See generallyMarkham, supra note 2; Chamorro-Courtland, The Trillion
Dollar Question, supra note 5.
36 ALLIANCEBERNSTEIN ET AL., REPORT TO THE SUPERVISORS OF THE MAJOR
OTC DERIVATIVES DEALERS ON THE PROPOSALS OF CENTRALIZED CDS CLEARING
SOLUTIONS FOR THE SEGREGATION AND PORTABILITY OF CUSTOMER CDS POSI-
TIONS AND RELATED MARGIN (June 30, 2009) [hereinafter REPORT ON MARGIN
SEGREGATION].
37 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14.
38 Markham, supra note 2.
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there is a flaw39 in the Futures Model; however, his discussion
was limited.
Markham is also correct in noting that the legislative reforms
are all piecemeal attempts to patch a system that has outlived its
usefulness.... A uniform approach to the protection of customer
custody requirements is needed .... [C]ustomer funds [should] be
treated individually at all levels;40 however, he does not mention
which segregation model should be adopted.
Fourth, this Article answers an important question raised by
Professor Ronald Filler:
Another issue which needs to be addressed and which depends
on future CFTC rulemaking involves how customer assets held
by a defaulting FCM that is also a clearing member firm of a
central clearinghouse (CCP) should or should not be fully pro-
tected if such a default results in a shortfall in the customer
segregated account held at the CCP on behalf of the de-
faulting FCM.41
Fifth, the literature does not discuss the advantages of adopt-
ing the LSOC Model in the futures industry.42
In sum, these reports and articles do not provide a convincing
justification for the different legal treatment of cleared swaps cus-
tomers and futures customers. This Article argues that there are
advantages to introducing the LSOC Model to the futures indus-
try, as this will increase the level of protection provided to futures
customers. It will explain the legal basis for this radical change.
I. THE ROLE OF MARGIN
The role of margin depends on the type of transaction it is
used for.43 In the derivative markets, the purpose of the margin is 
39 Id. at 124.
40 Id. at 13132. 
41 Ronald H. Filler, Consumer Protection: How U.K. Client MoneyRules Differ
From U.S. Customer Segregated Rules When a Custodian Fails to Treat Cus-
tomer PropertyProperly, 24 J. TAXN & REG. FIN. INSTS. 25, 10 (2011).
42 Although Linklaters confirms that [t]he CFTC is considering whether to 
adopt the LSOC Model for the futures market, they have not commented on 
whether the CFTC should adopt this change. LINKLATERS, supra note 12, at 4.
43 In the securities markets, margin is used as a deposit to purchase a 
security in the form of a share or bond. CHISHOLM, supra note 8, at 6. This
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to serve as a guarantee of performance;44 in other words, it oper-
ates as a performance deposit45 that is returned upon the settle-
ment of a transaction if the participants fulfill their obligations.
A. The EconomicPurpose ofMargin
Generally, a customer will have a margin account with a bro-
ker, the broker will have a margin account with a CM, and the
CM will have a margin account with the CCP. Therefore, cus-
tomers have an indirect clearing relationship with the CCP.
CCPs demand margin from their CMs46 in the form of cash or
securities to protect themselves against a CM default. CMs will
also demand margin from their customers so that the CM can pro-
tect itself from the insolvency of a customer.
Customers and CMs post margin to operate as a collateral
safety net for ensuring that exposures do not build up; margin is
the CCPs first line of defense against default risk.47 The CCP
can use the collateral in the margin account to cover the obliga-
tions of a defaulting counterparty.48
CCP clearing arrangements in effect convert the CCP and their
CMs into a form of super-priority creditor.49 The CCP and its
CMs will have the right to sell off their full claims and assume
the losses out of the defaulters margin account prior to the de-
faulters general creditors.50 CCPs require their members to post
two types of margin: initial margin and variation margin.51
Article does not focus on the securities markets, although some consideration
will be given below.
44 Ray L. Ross, FinancialConsequences ofTrading Commodity Futures
Contracts, 15.2 ILL. AGRIC. ECON. 27, 27 (1975).
45 CHISHOLM, supra note 8, at 3940. 
46 The CM must be a registered FCM in the United States.
47 David S. Bates & Roger Caine, Valuing the Futures Market Clearinghouses 
Default Exposure During the 1987 Crash, 31.2 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
248, 248 (1999).
48 This could be either a CM or a CMs customer. 
49 Super-priority creditors are a special class of creditor who are paid before
all the other creditors of the insolvent counterparty. Christian Chamorro-
Courtland, The LegalAspects ofNon-FinancialMarket CentralCounterparties,
27.4 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 553, 555 (2012).
50 Id. at 575.
51 These two types of margin are examined below.
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1. InitialMargin
A market participant must post initial margin to enter into an
initial transaction.52 This type of margin is designed to ensure
that the CCP has sufficient funds to cover potential losses due to
a default in normal market conditions. This is provided in the form
of cash and/or securities.53
2. Variation Margin
In the case of futures and swaps contracts, the values of these
contracts fluctuate54 throughout the day. Variation margin55 is
the minimum level at which CMs and customers must maintain
their margin over time. It is calculated by using a risk manage-
ment tool known as marking-to-market, which requires sub-
tracting a contracts current market value from the previous days 
market value.56
Variation margin is collected from participants whose positions
have suffered a loss and paid to the participants whose positions
have made a profit at the end of the day. Consequently, profits
and losses are credited to, or debited from, the margin accounts of
the relevant CMs and customers. It operates as a daily settlement
of a market participants outstanding positions by resetting the
daily value of the underlying contract. It is provided in the form
of cash.57
This system reduces the buildup of financial exposures over
time in open futures and swaps contracts, which typically have
long clearing cycles.58 A proper functioning margin system and
52 CHISHOLM, supra note 8, at 40.
53 I.e., shares or bonds.
54 Fluctuations arise from changing demand and supply of a particular
commodity, carry costs, interest rates, storage costs, and speculative trading.
55 Also known as maintenance margin. 
56 The calculation proceeds as follows:
Variation margin = (todays closing price  yesterdays closing price) x 
number of contracts x contract size.
57 BNY MELLON, CLEARED SWAP HANDBOOK, https://www.bnymellon.com
/_global-assets/pdf/solutions-index/cleared-swap-handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5R3E-8U6D].
58 Futures and swaps contracts typically remain open for a prolonged period
of time, i.e., for months or years. Therefore, the underlying price on which the
derivatives contract is based will fluctuate over time.
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methodology59 allows CCPs to realize trading profits and losses
on a daily or intra-daily basis60 in order to reduce loss-making
positions at the first sign of extreme negative changes61 in mar-
ket positions.62
The CCP monitors the positions of CMs intraday, and a failure
to meet a margin call is a counterparty default that will result in
a closeout of open positions.63 Therefore, the maximum that a CM
or the CCP can ever lose is the defaulted amount within one trad-
ing day. If a CM and its customer default before posting the var-
iation margin they owe, the CCP will have to assume the loss from
its default waterfall.
3. Excess Margin
Excess margin may accumulate in a customers account for 
various reasons. First, it is typical for CMs to require their custom-
ers to post a larger amount of initial margin64 than is requested
by the CCP.65 This acts as a buffer in case customers default on
their obligations to the CM.
59 CCPs will typically calculate the amount of margin required by using a
formula that calculates the risk of all positions entered into by CMs and their
customers. It is noted that most CCPs use the Standard Portfolio Analysis of
Risk (SPAN) portfolio margining system. This Article does not examine the 
various methodologies used by CCPs for calculating margin. See generallyDIV.
OF TRADING & MKTS, COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMN, REPORT ON LES-
SONS LEARNED FROM THE FAILURE OF KLEIN & CO. FUTURES, INC. 3 (July 2001),
http://www.cftc.gov/files/tm/tmklein_report071101.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVV7-M
A9S] [hereinafter CFTC REPORT ON KLEIN & CO.].
60 As opposed to settling their entire losses on the contractual settlement date.
61 Jerry W. Markham, FederalRegulation ofMargin in the Commodity
Futures Industry History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 65 (1991). For
example, variation margin payments at CME averaged $2.2 billion per day
through June 30, 2010, and reached an historical record of $18.5 billion on
October 13, 2008.
62 CHISHOLM, supra note 8, at 40. See generally TINA P. HASENPUSCH,
CLEARING SERVICES FOR GLOBAL MARKETS 3031 (2009). 
63 The positions are terminated by the CCP with closeout netting.
64 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INTL SETTLEMENTS,
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BANK EXPOSURES TO CENT. COUNTERPARTIES 4
(Apr. 2014) [hereinafter BIS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS].
65 While an FCM is not permitted to place lower margin requirements 
upon its customers, the FCM is free to require any or all customers to post
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Second, some jurisdictions permit the practice of posting gross
margin to the CM and net margin to the CCP.66 This leaves the
CM in possession of the customers excess margin. Third, the cus-
tomer may have excess funds in the account after closing out an
open position. Fourth, a customer may receive variation margin
after marking-to-market from the CM if its positions are profitable.
The risk exists that CMs will use customer excess margin for
their own purposes. Therefore, this excess margin will be exposed
to significant losses if it is not adequately protected by the law.
a. Examples ofMargin
On June 1, Bill instructs his FCM, TradeStation Securities Inc.
(TradeStation), to purchase one September E-mini S&P 50067
futures contract on the CME Globex Platform (the futures ex-
change) when the contract is trading at 1050.00 points. The con-
tract has a value of $52,500, which is determined by multiplying
$50 by the S&P 500 Stock Index.68
CME Group (the CCP) requires TradeStation to post initial
margin of $4,000 in the form of securities or cash with the CCP
on behalf of its customers for this futures contract. Bill must
post initial margin of $4,500 in the form of securities or cash in its
margin account managed by TradeStation, which includes an ex-
cess margin requirement of $500.
Bill must maintain a maintenance margin of $3,700 during the
period the futures contract remains executory. This means that
higher levels of margin. CFTC REPORT ON KLEIN & CO., supra note 59, at 3.
CMs are not allowed to collect from their customers less than 100 percent of
the initial margin requirements that are requested by the CCP. 17 C.F.R.
§ 39.13(g)(8)(ii) (2012).
66 See REPORT ON MARGIN SEGREGATION, supra note 36, at 26.
67 A stock index is a statistic that reflects the composite value of a selected 
group of stocks. The S&P 500, for example, is an index comprised of 500 stocks
chosen for market size, liquidity and industry grouping .... Stock index futures
allow traders to buy and sell the strength of an entire cash index without hav-
ing to own every individual stock, making them a practical trading instrument.
Each stock index future trades on a multiple of the underlying cash index, and
because they are not based on a tangible commodity, they are settled in cash. 
Jean Folger, Beginners Guide to E-Mini Futures Contracts: What are the E-
Minis?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/how-to-trade-e
-mini-futures-contracts/what-are-the-eminis.asp [https://perma.cc/NR7G-5HLE].
68 50 x 1050.00 = 52,500.
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Bill will have to post additional margin with TradeStation to bring
the margin account back up to $4,500 if price fluctuations of the
contract bring the balance in the account under $3,700. Therefore,
variation margin will result in either a debit or a credit to Bills 
margin account at the end of the day.
On June 2, the index goes down by 10 points and the contract
value decreases by $500,69 which means that TradeStation will
debit Bills margin account by $500 and post the margin with the 
CCP. Bill will have $4,000 in his margin account.
On June 3, the index goes up by 6 points and the contract value
increases by $300,70 which means that TradeStation will credit
Bills margin account by $300 with margin that it has received 
from the CCP. Bill will have $4,300 in his margin account.
On June 4, the index goes down by 16 points and the contract
value decreases by $800, which means that TradeStation will
debit Bills margin account by $800 and post the margin with the 
CCP. Bill will have $3,500 in his margin account, which means
that the level will fall below the maintenance margin require-
ment of $3,700.
TradeStation will place a margin call on Bill to post an addi-
tional $1,000 in the margin account and bring the level back to
$4,500 before it will allow Bill to continue trading the next day.
TradeStation will close out Bills positions and consider him to be 
in default if he does not pay the maintenance margin.
4. Gross Margin Versus Net Margin
CMs will post margin on either a gross71 or net72 basis to the
CCP. The Canadian Securities Administrators Derivatives Com-
mittee (CSA) has noted that
[c]ollecting margin on a gross basis73 means that each individual
customers margin is collected and then advanced to the CCP. 
69 50 x 1040.00 = 52,000.
70 50 x 1046.00 = 52,300.
71 This requires separate margin to be posted for every position.
72 The long positions are netted against short positions and margin is re-
quired against the aggregate position. LCH.Clearnet calculates margin in
this fashion.
73 See infra Diagram 1.
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Collecting margin on a net basis74 means that the different
positions of a clearing members customers are offset and only 
margin for the remaining exposure is advanced to the CCP.75
Diagram 1: Gross Margin Diagram 2: Net Margin
Knott and Mills have noted that CCPs in England collect ini-
tial margin on a net basis from their CMs, as gross margining
reduces the earnings of CMs on client margin funds.76 For exam-
ple, LCH.Clearnet Ltd. calculates margin on a net basis.77 They
have argued that gross margining makes clearing members more 
vulnerable to bankruptcy, and more likely to raise clearing fees78
for their customers. CMs may even have to use customer excess
margin to cover the obligations they owe to their customers.
The CSA has recommended, nevertheless, that customer initial
margin should be required to be provided to a CCP on a gross 
basis79 because this should ensure that all customer positions 
of a [CM] are adequately collateralized. Margin calculated on a
gross basis affords no netting efficiency, but generally prevents
customer positions from being under-margined, facilitating the
porting of customer positions.80
74 See infra Diagram 2.
75 CSA CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 7, at 18 (emphasis added).
76 Raymond Knott & Alastair Mills, Modeling Riskin CentralCounterparty
Clearing Houses: A Review, 13 FIN. STABILITY REV. 163, 163 (Dec. 2002).
77 REPORT ON MARGIN SEGREGATION, supra note 36, at 112.
78 Knott & Mills, supra note 76, at 163 n.3.
79 CSA CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 7, at 18.
80 Id. The term under-margined refers to a situation in which there is less 
than sufficient collateral within an omnibus account to support the collateral
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CME requires its customers to post the gross amount of 
margin, even if a CMs customer positions are exactly offsetting 
in the aggregate.81 The CFTC changed its regulations to make sure
that all CCPs in the United States collect initial margin on a gross
basis from their CMs.82 CCPs may, however, collect initial margin
on a net basis for the proprietary accounts of their CMs.83
II. SEGREGATION AND PORTABILITY
In response to the global financial crisis, the Technical Com-
mittee of the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
(CPSS-IOSCO) created a report, Principles for FinancialMar-
ket Infrastructures,84 in order to highlight, inter alia, the interna-
tional best practices for the protection of margin. It recommends
that all CCPs harmonize their rules and procedures to support
the segregation and portability85 of customer margin.
It further recommends that customer margin be segregated
in order to protect customer assets in the event of the CMs 
requirements of each customer position. Id. at 18 n.44. The CSA Consultation
Paper does not consider whether variation margin should also be posted on a
gross basis.
81 REPORT ON MARGIN SEGREGATION, supra note 36, at 53.
82 17 C.F.R. §§ 39.13(g)(8)(i)(A), (D) (2012). The CFTC Regulations do not
mention whether variation margin should be collected on a gross basis.
83 17 C.F.R. § 39.13(g)(8)(i)(E).
84 COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECHNICAL COMM. INTL
ORG. SEC. COMMNS, BANK FOR INTL SETTLEMENTS, PRINCIPLES FOR FINAN-
CIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 66 (Mar. 2011).
85 CSA CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 7, at 3. Porting is
a key mechanism to ensure that in the event of a clearing
member default or insolvency, customer positions are not ter-
minated and customer positions and collateral can be trans-
ferred to one or more non-defaulting clearing members without
having to liquidate and re-establish the positions .... In order
for such transfer to be achieved the customer collateral and po-
sitions must be immediately identifiable, transferable and
unencumbered. If customer collateral cannot be distinguished
from the proprietary assets of the insolvent or defaulting clear-
ing member, such collateral may not be available to secure the
obligation for which the collateral was provided or there may
be delays in accessing such collateral.
Id. at 4, 12 (emphasis added).
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insolvency. However, it does not endorse a particular segregation
model.86 Segregation should allow customers to easily identify 
and recover or transfer their collateral in the event that their
CM becomes insolvent.87
The CM is required to hold the margin of its customers in an
account (the client account) that is separate from its own assets
(the proprietary account).88 Additionally, the segregated margin
must be free from liens and rights of set off, except for situations
where the CCP and CM are securing for the contractual trades of
the customer.89 Segregation, however, can take various forms in
the legal sense, as discussed below.
Porting has also been recognized as an important tool for 
protecting customers. It allows the non-defaulting customers to
immediately transfer (by novation) their margin and contractual
positions to a solvent CM and avoid replacement cost risk.90
In theory, the proper segregation of margin should facilitate
the portability of customer margin upon the insolvency of a CM,
provided that customer margin can be immediately identified by
the CCP.91 In practice, not all segregation models require the CCP
to keep records that clearly identify the margin deposits of cus-
tomers (e.g., the Futures Model).
III. THE CLEARING ARRANGEMENT
In order to enter into futures and swaps transactions, cus-
tomers must maintain a clearing relationship with a CM, which
86 Id. at 25.
87 Id. at 4.
88 Id. at 1415. 
89 REPORT ON MARGIN SEGREGATION, supra note 36, at 53.
90 Replacement cost risk is [t]he risk that a counterparty to an outstanding 
transaction for completion at a future date will fail to perform on the settle-
ment date. This failure may leave the solvent party with an un-hedged or open
market position or deny the solvent party unrealized gains on the position. The
resulting exposure is the cost of replacing, at current market prices, the origi-
nal transaction. Definition ofReplacement Risk, GLOBALCUSTODY.NET, http://
www.globalcustody.net/Replacement_cost_risk/ [https://perma.cc/Y2LK-FXJ9].
91 CME implies that a successful porting of customer accounts requires
information that is 100% accurate .... Recent experience demonstrates, how-
ever, that transfers can occur despite less than perfect information .... [T]he
key issue will be to identify the collateral attributable to the defaulting
customer. CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6348 (emphasis added).
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will serve as their agent and guarantor92 with respect to
transactions cleared at the CCP. The customers and CMs will be
contractually bound by the clearing rules contained in the CCP
clearing arrangement.
Under the clearing arrangement, the CM is liable to the CCP
for all the obligations of its customers.93 The CM will have to
cover the obligations of any defaulting customers from its share-
holder equity.94 A CCP guarantees the trades of a defaulting
CM through the process of counterparty substitution.95 The clear-
ing rules contain a set of default procedures (the default waterfall),
which determine the order in which funds are made available to 
cure a clearing member default.96
A. Default Resources
Section 39.11(b) of the CFTC Regulations lists the financial
resources that a CCP has at its disposal as part of its default
waterfall when a CM becomes insolvent.97 The CCP can decide
the sequence in which the funds and assets of the defaulting 
clearing member and its customers ... would be applied in the
event of a default.98 A CCP will typically use the available re-
sources in the following order99:
(1) The defaulting clearing members margin (including
variation margin and initial margin);
(2) The defaulting clearing members guaranty fund100
contributions;
92 REPORT ON MARGIN SEGREGATION, supra note 36, at 5152. 
93 COOCONNECT, supra note 1.
94 Id.
95 See CME RULEBOOK, supra note 14, Rule 804.
96 CSA CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 7, at 15 n.28.
97 17 C.F.R. § 39.11(b) (2012).
98 17 C.F.R. § 39.16(c)(iv).
99 See generallyChamorro-Courtland, The Trillion Dollar Question, supra
note 5.
100 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6365 n.254:
A guaranty fund is a fund created by a DCO to which the
clearing members contribute, in proportion generally set by
DCO rule .... The assets in the fund are then available to cover
losses resulting from defaults by one or more clearing members,
whether in their proprietary capacity or due to customer
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(a) The margin of futures customers (including de-
faulting and non-defaulting customers);
(3) The CCPs own equityand financial resources;
(4) The guaranty fund contributions of solvent clearing
members;
(5) Voluntary contributions by solvent clearing members;
(6) Additional resources, e.g., CCP assessment powers,
emergency lines of credit, and insurance.
The CCP has access to more resources in a double default
situation under the Futures Model. A CCP can access the mar-
gin (including initial, variation, and excess margin) of the de-
faulting and non-defaulting futures customers in an omnibus
account after all of the resources of the defaulting CM have been
exhausted (i.e., at stage 2.a).101 The CCP may exhaust the mar-
gin of the non-defaulting customers until it has fully covered the
obligations of the defaulting customers.
In contrast, the CCP is not permitted to access the margin of
non-defaulting cleared swaps customers in a double default situ-
ation under the LSOC Model.102 The CCP may only access the
margin of defaulting customers up to the amount of their indi-
vidual obligations.103
IV. FUTURES COMMISSION MERCHANT INSOLVENCIES
The CFTC Report has noted that FCM insolvencies present
different legal challenges for the bankruptcy trustee in different
situations:
When discussing the issues surrounding an FCM bankruptcy
under the Bankruptcy Code, analytically there are several
scenarios to consider: (1) [t]he bankruptcy is unrelated to the
accounts, to the extent those losses are not covered by avail-
able collateral provided by the defaulting Clearing Member
(limited to proprietary collateral for a default in the clearing
members proprietary account, or including customer collat-
eral for a customer default).
101 Id. at 63465. 
102 Id.
103 Stage 2.a is not included in the default waterfall of a CCP that clears
for cleared swaps customers. Id. at 6340.
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loss of customer funds, and there is no such loss; (2) [t]he bank-
ruptcy involves shortfalls in customer funds due to operational
risks; (3) [t]he bankruptcy involves losses due to customer risk
(i.e., a customer incurs a loss in excess of the FCMs financial 
ability to cover); or (4) the bankruptcy involves shortfalls in
customer funds due to operational risk and losses due to cus-
tomer risk.104
The first scenario deals with situations where the FCM de-
faults, but none of the customers have defaulted. This situation
does not generally provide any legal complications under the Fu-
tures Model or LSOC Model, as there should not be any shortfalls
in customer margin. The bankruptcy trustee should be able to port
or return to customers 100 percent of their margin in accordance
with Part 190 of the CFTC Regulations.105
The second scenario deals with situations where the FCM de-
faults due to operational risks, which can arise from negligence,
fraud, human error, or computer systems malfunctioning. This
situation may require the trustee to distribute customer margin
on a pro rata basis, even if margin is held under the LSOC Model.
The customers will have to share in the shortfall if the bankruptcy
trustee is unable to allocate these losses to specific customers due
to corrupted or lost records.
The third scenario deals with situations where there has been
a double default. The Futures Model will allocate losses resulting
from fellow customer risk on a pro rata basis. The LSOC Model
protects customers from fellow customer risk, and these custom-
ers should have 100 percent of their margin returned or ported.
The fourth scenario deals with situations where the FCM de-
faults due to a combination of operational risk and one or more
customers defaulting on their obligations (i.e., a double default).
In this situation, it is likely that the bankruptcy trustee will have
to distribute margin on a pro rata basis, including for customers
holding under the LSOC Model.
This Article notes that futures customers would receive pro-
tection from fellow customer risk in the third scenario if the LSOC
Model were adopted. The current law does not protect futures and
cleared swaps customers from ratably sharing losses resulting
104 Id. at 6340.
105 See generallyFiller, supra note 41, at 5.
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from the FCMs fraud or other operational risks under scenarios
two and four. It is therefore necessary to introduce insurance in
the derivatives markets.
V. THE U.S. LAWS ON MARGIN SEGREGATION
The current margin segregation laws in the United States
require simplification, as they are located in multiple sources.106
The CEA contains the laws applying to futures customers. The
DFA amended the CEA, which now also contains the laws for
cleared swaps customers. These statutes have been codified under
the United States Code.107 Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code ap-
plies if the FCM defaults.
The CEA established the CFTC as the main regulator for the
futures and cleared swaps markets.108 This statute provides
the CFTC with the authority to publish regulations in Title 17 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R. or CFTC Regulation).109
The United States Code takes precedence over the C.F.R. if there
are any contradictory provisions.110
A. The Segregation Requirement in the Futures Markets
Section 4d(a) of the CEA111 introduced a segregation require-
ment to enhance the protection of margin posted by futures cus-
tomers to their FCMs. It provides that an FCM shall
106 The CFTC notes that [t]he CEA section numbers do not always corre-
spond directly to the section in the U.S. Code where the CEA is codified. Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission, J. REG., http://thejournalofregulation
.com/en/article/us-commodity-futures-trading-commission-cftc/ [https://perma.cc
/6EGJ-DUDJ].
107 This is the codification of the laws made by Congress. See 7 U.S.C. § 1
(2015).
108 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMN, LAW AND REGULATION,
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/index.htm [https://perma.cc/MC7R-HBRA].
109 See 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2015). This is the codification of the regulations created
by U.S. federal regulatory agencies, including the SEC and CFTC.
110 The courts, however, may show deference to a specialized regulatory
agencys (e.g., the CFTCs) interpretation of a particular law.
111 This section has been codified as 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2) (2015) and 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.20(f)(1) (2015). U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMN, COMMODITY
EXCHANGE ACT, http://www.cftc.gov/lawregulation/commodityexchangeact/index
.htm [https://perma.cc/F6TA-5H4J].
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treat anddealwith all money, securities, and property received
by such person to margin, guarantee, or secure the trades or
contracts of any customer of such person, or accruing to such
customer as the result of such trades or contracts, as belong-
ing to suchcustomer. Such money, securities, and property shall
be separatelyaccounted for and shallnot be commingled with
the funds of such commission merchant or be used to margin or
guarantee the trades or contracts, or to secure or extendthe credit,
ofanycustomer or person other than the one for whom the same
are held.112
Professor Markham has noted that the segregation require-
ment was intended to require that customer funds be held in a 
trust account.113 This was intended to provide FCM customers
with proprietary rights in the margin that they deposited with
their FCM (the trustee).
Upon an FCMs insolvency, this section provides futures cus-
tomers with priority to recover their margin deposits before the
FCMs other general creditors.114 This section was originally cre-
ated to prevent a common practice of FCMs having unlimited use
of customer excess margin for their own purposes.115
B. The Segregation Requirement for ClearedSwaps
In response to the 2008 global financial crisis, Congress passed
the DFA to address the potential threat of systemic risk that
could be caused by systemically important financial institutions116
112 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2) (emphasis added). This section is repeated in 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.20(f)(1), which uses similar language.
113 Markham, supra note 2, at 94 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-1637, at 6 (1934)).
114 80 CONG. REC. 7858 (1936) (statement of Sen. Murray). Senator James
Murray stated that § 4d(a) merely provides that the publics money put up 
for margin shall in fact be treated as belonging to the customer, and held in
trust. Id.
115 See Markham, supra note 2, at 94 n.19 (citing Dorn v. Shearson Hayden
Stone, CFTC No. R 77-167, 1981 WL 26035 (Oct. 6, 1981)).
116 The DFA contains the following definition:
The terms systemically important and systemic importance 
mean a situation where the failure of or a disruption to the func-
tioning of a financial market utility or the conduct of a pay-
ment, clearing, or settlement activity could create, or increase,
the risk of significant liquidity or credit problems spreading
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during times of financial market turmoil. This Act has modified
the regulatory structure for CCPs that are considered systemi-
cally important117 and too big to fail.
First, it mandates central clearing of standardized OTC
swaps118 on DCOs as a new safeguard. Second, it created
the Cleared Swaps Customers Account and introduced the 
LSOC Model for the protection of margin posted by cleared
swaps customers.119
The DFA introduced a provision mirroring section 4d(a) of the
CEA in order to enhance the protection of the margin that cleared
swaps customers post with their FCMs. Section 724(a)(2)(A) of
the DFA120 provides that
[a] futures commission merchant shalltreat and dealwith all
money, securities, and property of anyswaps customer received
to margin, guarantee, or secure a swap cleared by or through a
derivatives clearing organization (including money, securities,
among financial institutions or markets and thereby threaten
the stability of the financial system of the United States.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 803(9), 124 Stat. 1376, 1807 (2010).
117 These CCPs have been reclassified as Derivatives Clearing Organiza-
tions (DCEs). The term designated clearing entity means a designated fi-
nancial market utility that is a derivatives clearing organization registered
under section 5b of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 7a-1) or a clearing
agency registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under sec-
tion 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78q-1). Dodd-Frank 
Act § 803(3). The CFTC and SEC may prescribe regulations for the CCPs they
regulate. Id. § 805(2)(A). A discussion on DCEs and Clearing Agencies is out-
side the scope of this Article. The term financial market utility means any 
person that manages or operates a multilateral system for the purpose of trans-
ferring, clearing, or settling payments, securities, or other financial transac-
tions among financial institutions or between financial institutions and the
person. Id. § 803(6)(A). Furthermore, the term designated financial market 
utility means a financial market utility that the Council has designated as 
systemically important under § 804. Id. § 803(4).
118 Id. § 723(a)(3) (mandating the clearing of swaps through a DCO); id.
§ 763(a) (mandating the clearing of security-based swaps through a clearing
agency).
119 CME GRP., LSCO AND CLEARED SWAPS CUSTOMER PROTECTION, http://
www.cmegroup.com/clearing/risk-management/lsoc-cleared-swaps-customer-pro
tection.html [https://perma.cc/3W3M-ZRP6].
120 Section 724(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA and added a
new § 4d(f), which has been codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6d and 17 C.F.R. § 22.2.
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or property accruing to the swaps customer as the result of such
a swap) as belonging to the swaps customer.121
Section 724(a)(2)(B) of the DFA provides that
[m]oney, securities, and property of a swaps customer described
in subparagraph (A) shall be separatelyaccountedfor andshall
not be commingled with the funds ofthe futures commission
merchant or be used to margin, secure, or guarantee anytrades
or contracts ofany swaps customer or person other than the
person for whom the same are held.122
C. The Segregation Requirement for CCPs
CFTC Regulation 1.20(g) imposes the segregation requirement
on CCPs that hold futures customer margin:
All futures customer funds received by a derivatives clearing
organization from a member to purchase, margin, guarantee,
secure or settle the trades, contracts or commodity options of
the clearing members futures customers and all money accru-
ing to such futures customers as the result of trades, contracts
or commodity options so carried shall be separatelyaccounted
for and segregated as belonging to such futures customers, and
a derivatives clearing organization shallnot hold, use or dispose
ofsuch futures customer funds except as belonging to such fu-
tures customers. A derivatives clearing organization shall de-
posit futures customer funds under an account name that
clearly identifies them as futures customer funds and shows
that such funds are segregated as required by sections 4d(a)
and 4d(b) of the Act and by this part.123
Section 724(a)(6) of the DFA now extends this requirement to
CCPs that hold cleared swaps customer margin:
It shall be unlawful for any person, including any derivatives
clearing organization and any depositoryinstitution, that has
received any money, securities, or property for deposit in a
separate account or accounts as provided in paragraph (2) [of
121 Dodd-Frank Act § 724(a)(2)(A) (2010) (Swaps; Segregation and Bank-
ruptcy Treatment ... Segregation Required.) (emphasis added). This section 
has been codified at 17 C.F.R. § 22.2(a) (2015).
122 Dodd-Frank Act § 724(a)(2)(B) (Commingling Prohibited.) (emphasis 
added). This has been codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6d(f)(2)(B) and 17 C.F.R. § 22.2(c).
123 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(g)(1) (2015) (emphasis added). This is repeated in 17
C.F.R. § 39.15(b)(1) (2015).
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section 724(a)] to hold, dispose of, or use anysuch money, se-
curities, or propertyas belonging to the depositing futures com-
mission merchant or any person other than the swaps customer
of the futures commission merchant.124
D. Observations
The statutory language used to describe the segregation re-
quirement is very similar for both futures and swaps customers. 
Customers in both markets, therefore, should theoretically have
the same level of protection.
This Article argues that these sections were introduced in order
to prohibit the FCM and the CCP from using the margin of non-
defaulting customers of an insolvent FCM to cover the obliga-
tions of any defaulting customers.
In order to achieve protection against fellow-customer risk,
the LSOC Model is required as a minimum level of protection in
both the futures and cleared swaps markets. It has been observed
that futures customers are currently not protected from fellow
customer risk,125 which is contrary to the statutory intention of
the CEA.
VI. CUSTOMER MARGIN ACCOUNTS
FCMs can maintain up to three different types of accounts126
for their customers: Customer Segregated Accounts, Cleared
Swaps Customer Accounts, and 30.7 Accounts.127 The Futures
Industry Association (FIA) has noted that 
[t]he requirement to maintain these separate accounts reflects
the different risks posed by the different products. Cash, secu-
rities, and other collateral ... required to be held in one type of
account, e.g., the Customer Segregated Account, may not be
commingled with funds required to be held in another type of
124 Codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6d(f)(6) and 17 C.F.R. § 22.7 (emphasis added).
125 See LSCO AND CLEARED SWAPS CUSTOMER PROTECTION, supra note 119.
126 See generallyFUTURES INDUS. ASSN, PROTECTION OF CUSTOMER FUNDS,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, VERSION 3.0 4 (May 2014).
127 An FCM will deposit the margin of customers that trade futures and
options listed on foreign exchanges in a 30.7 Account. 17 C.F.R. § 30.7 (2015)
U.S. laws therefore may not apply to these accounts. Since 30.7 Accounts do
not receive protection from the CEA and U.S. Bankruptcy Code, they are out-
side the scope of this Article.
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account, e.g., the 30.7 Account, except128 as the [CFTC] may
permit by order.129
A. Customer Segregated Account
The FCM will deposit the margin of customers that trade fu-
tures and options130 listed on U.S. futures exchanges in a Cus-
tomer Segregated Account in accordance with section 4d(a) of the
CEA. The FCM must separately account131 for and segregate all
customer margin from the FCMs proprietary accounts,132 is pro-
hibited from commingling customer margin with its own margin
in the same account, and shall treat and deal with the funds of a
futures customer as belonging to such futures customer.133 This
is a form of collective trust, according to Professor Markham.134
The FCM may only commingle customer margin in a single
omnibus account for convenience.135 This financial innovation 
provides greater capital efficiency due to margin reductions 
128 The CFTC may permit the FCM to commingle customer margin across
the different account types. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reformation and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 724(a)(3)(B), 124 Stat. 1376,
1807 (2010); 17 C.F.R. 1.20(e)(3) (2015). For example, in August of 2012, the
CFTC authorized ICE Clear Europe Limited, which is registered with the
Commission as a DCO, and its FCM clearing members, to commingle margin
posted for cleared swaps with margin posted for foreign futures and foreign
options (which should typically be held in a 30.7 Account) traded on ICE
Futures Europe in the Cleared Swaps Customer Account. This was done to al-
low portfolio margining. See FUTURES INDUS. ASSN, supra note 126, at 5 n.5.
129Id. at 5; see also CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6359.
130 This Article does not consider the options markets.
131 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(a) (A futures commission merchant must separately 
account for all futures customer funds and segregate such funds as belonging
to its futures customers. A futures commission merchant shall deposit futures
customer funds under an account name that clearly identifies them as futures
customer funds and shows that such funds are segregated as required by
§ 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the [CEA] and by this part.) (emphasis added). 
132 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)(2).
133 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(f)(1) (Limitation on use offutures customer funds. A
futures commission merchant shall treat and deal with the funds of a futures
customer as belonging to such futures customer. A futures commission mer-
chant shall not use the funds of a futures customer to secure or guarantee the
commodity interests, or to secure or extend the credit, of any person other than
the futures customer for whom the funds are held.) (emphasis added). 
134 Markham, supra note 2, at 95.
135 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)(1).
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for correlated positions,136 which reduces costs for all the mar-
ket participants.
The Customer Segregated Account may137 be held at the fol-
lowing permitted depositories138: a bank or trust company lo-
cated in the United States,139 another FCM,140 a DCO,141 or a bank
or trust company located outside of the United States that has
regulatory capital in excess of $1 billion.142 The requirement for
holding a Customer Segregated Account away from the FCM re-
duces the ability of the FCM to perpetrate fraud and misuse
customer margin.143
The FCM is required to make a daily computation (marking-
to-market) of the total amount of futures customer funds on de-
posit in segregated accounts on behalf of futures customers.144
The FCM should immediately report a shortfall to the CFTC and
Designated Self-Regulatory Organization (DSRO), and bring 
the amount up to the necessary level by depositing its own funds
if necessary.145 The FCM is also required to submit bimonthly,146
monthly,147 and annual reports148 to the CFTC or its DSRO.
136 Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Notice of Proposed Rule-
makingRisk Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organi-
zations, 76 Fed. Reg. 3698, 3716 (Jan. 20, 2011).
137 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(b). The use of the term may instead of must in rule 
§ 1.20(b) introduces legal uncertainty, as it suggests that FCMs may hold a Cus-
tomer Segregated Account at a location that is different from the list provided
in the regulation (e.g., a FCM may hold the account for their immediate cus-
tomers). The language used by the FIA, however, clarifies that customer margin
cannot be held by the immediate FCM and is required to be held in Customer 
Accounts at a bank or trust company, a DCO or another FCM. FUTURES IN-
DUS. ASSN, supra note 126, at 12 (emphasis added).
138 The segregation requirement applies to margin deposits held at a per-
mitted depository. 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(f)(3); 17 C.F.R. § 22.4 (2015).
139 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(b)(1).
140 Id. § 1.20(b)(3).
141 Id. § 1.20(b)(2).
142 Id. § 1.20(c). See generallyid. § 1.49.
143 However, this risk is substituted for the risk that the CCP or the depos-
itory will commit fraud or experience operational risk.
144 17 C.F.R. § 1.32(a)(1) (2015).
145 Id. § 1.32(a)(2).
146 Id. § 1.32(f).
147 17 C.F.R. § 1.10(b)(1)(i) (2015).
148 Id. § 1.10(b)(1)(ii).
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Aside from the previously mentioned reports, there is no re-
quirement for FCMs to report and identify individual customer 
margin deposits to the CCP.149 The FCM merely needs to clearly
identify the location of each Customer Segregated Account and 
report on the total amount collectively held in segregation.150
The depository must provide a written acknowledgement to the
FCM that it has been informed that the margin it holds belongs
to the FCMs customers,151 and a copy of this acknowledgement
must be sent to the CFTC and the FCMs DSRO.152
In addition, the depository must provide the CFTC with
read-only electronic access to transaction and account balance
information for futures customer accounts.153 These reporting
requirements and direct online access by the CFTC should re-
duce instances of fraudulent activity by FCMs. This will aid
the DSRO in identifying any discrepancies between the amount
of segregated customer funds reported by the FCM and the per-
mitted depository.
B. Cleared Swaps Customer Account
The FCM will deposit the margin of customers who trade
swaps that are cleared through a registered DCO in a Cleared
Swaps Customer Account in accordance with the new section
4d(f) of the CEA. Although the rules are very similar to those
governing Customer Segregated Accounts, there are some im-
portant distinctions.
As with Customer Segregated Accounts, the FCM is prohibited
from commingling154 any margin it receives from swaps customers
with funds in its own proprietary account. The FCM shall not
use155 swaps customer margin to cover any obligations of the
149 17 C.F.R § 39.13(g)(8)(C) (2015).
150 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.32(f)(1)(2); NATL FUTURES ASSN MANUAL § 16(e), https://
www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx [hereinafter NFA MANUAL];
see also infra note 169.
151 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(d) (2015); see 17 C.F.R. § 1.20 app. A.
152 Id. § 1.20(d)(4).
153 Id. § 1.20(d)(3)(i).
154 7 U.S.C. § 6d(f)(2)(B) (2015); 17 C.F.R. § 22.2(c)(2)(i) (2015).
155 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 724(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376,
1683 (2010).
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other swaps customers and shall treat and deal with all swaps 
customer margin as belonging to the swaps customer.156
The FCM may also deposit and commingle swaps customer
margin with the margin of its other swaps customers for con-
venience.157 Further, it may use swaps customer margin to enter
into the same list of investments as those permitted for margin
held in Customer Segregated Accounts.158
The account may be held at the same list of permitted deposi-
tories159 allowed for Customer Segregated Accounts. An impor-
tant distinction is that an FCM may itself hold a Cleared Swaps
Customer Account for its immediate customers,160 which is not
possible for Customer Segregated Accounts. It is speculated that
this distinction exists because the reporting requirements for mar-
gin deposited in Cleared Swaps Customer Accounts are more
rigorous than for margin deposited in Segregated Customer Ac-
counts. This makes it harder for an FCM to misappropriate or
misallocate cleared swaps customer margin.
An FCM must provide the CCP [a]t least once each business 
day with information that is sufficient to identify, for each
Cleared Swaps Customer, the portfolio of rights and obligations
arising from the Cleared Swaps that such [FCM] intermediates
for such ... [c]ustomer.161
These daily reporting requirements add an extra layer of pro-
tection for swaps customers from fellow customer risk, from the
claims of an insolvent FCMs other creditors, and by facilitating 
156 Id. § 724(a)(2)(A).
157 Id. § 724(a)(3)(A)(i) (Exceptions: Use of FundsIn GeneralNotwith-
standing paragraph (2) [of § 724(a)], money, securities, and property of swap
customers of a futures commission merchant described in paragraph (2) may,
for convenience, be commingled and deposited in the same account or accounts
with any bank or trust company or with a derivatives clearing organization.) 
(emphasis added).
158 Id. § 724(a)(4) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 22.2(e)(1) (2010)) (noting that the 
futures commission merchant shall bear sole responsibility for any losses re-
sulting from the investment of customer funds in instruments described in
[17 C.F.R. § 1.25]). 
159 The list of permitted depositories is included in 17 C.F.R. § 1.49(d) (2015).
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 22.2(b)(3), 22.4, 22.9.
160 17 C.F.R. § 22.2(b)(2).
161 Id. § 22.11(c)(2).
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porting. Consequently, cleared swaps customers receive a higher
level of protection than futures customers if their FCMs default.
A permitted depository, which includes a CCP, must also
segregate customer margin from its own proprietary accounts: it
must treat162 the margin as belonging to the customer and may 
not hold, dispose of, or use the margin as belonging to the [FCM] 
or any person other than the swaps customer of the [FCM].163
An FCM may post any excess margin collected from Cleared
Swaps Customers to the CCP, provided that the CCPs rules 
permit this, and it is possible for the FCM to identify customer
margin on a daily basis.164
C. Losses Are Not SharedAcross Account Classes
The CFTC rules prohibit an FCM from using the funds of one 
customer to meet the obligations of another customer.165 Conse-
quently, losses will not be shared across account classes.166 For
example, a shortfall of customer margin in the Customer Segre-
gated Account will not be shared with customers of the Cleared
Swaps Customer Account.
D. The Buffer Margin 
The FCM is permitted in all account types to deposit its own
proprietary assets (cash and unencumbered securities) to act as
a buffer and to ensure that the customer margin accounts do not
become under-segregated.167
This buffer margin is known as the residual interest of 
the FCM.168 These assets are held for the benefit of futures 
162 Id. § 22.7.
163 Dodd-Frank Act § 724(a)(6).
164 17 C.F.R. § 22.13(c).
165 FUTURES INDUS. ASSN, supra note 126, at 8. See 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(c)
(2015).
166 Upon a double default, the [c]learing [h]ouse shall not apply segre-
gated customer collateral to any payment obligations or [l]osses arising from
a default in any proprietary account [of the FCM] or a different customer ac-
count class. CME RULEBOOK, supra note 14, Rule 802.G; see U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 763 (2015).
167 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.23(a)(1)(2) (2015). 
168 Id. § 1.23(c).
642 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:609
customers,169 and would presumably be distributed to margin
customers in the event of a shortfall in the relevant account in
priority to the other unsecured creditors of the FCM. Professor
Filler has noted that [m]ost large FCMs deposit a substantial
amount of their own capital in the customer segregated account
to provide excess funds in the event a futures customer does not
timely meet its margin requirements.170 The FCM must estab-
lish written procedures to ensure that the residual interest in the
customer margin accounts that it maintains does not fall below
a certain level.171 The FCM must immediately notify the CFTC
and its DSRO if the residual interest falls below this level.
E. Accounts Maintained byCCPs
CCPs will maintain a margin account for each asset class for
the FCMs proprietary positions (FCM Proprietary Accounts). 
They will also maintain an account for each asset class for the
FCMs customers (Customer Accounts). A CCP, therefore, must 
segregate customer margin from its own equity and the proprie-
tary margin of the FCMs.
The CCP must deposit customer margin in an account at a
permitted depository172 in the name of the CCP and for the bene-
fit of the FCMs customers.173 This includes a bank, a trust com-
pany, or at a Federal Reserve Bank if the CCP is classified as a
DCE. The CCP may commingle the customer margin it receives
from multiple FCMs in one omnibus account with the margin
of customers of the same account class. For example, the CCP
may commingle the Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral that
it receives from multiple [FCMs] on behalf of their Cleared
Swaps Customers.174
169 Id. § 1.23(a)(1); see also id. (Customer Segregated Accounts); id. §§ 30.7(a)
(d) (30.7 Accounts); id. § 22.2(e)(4) (Cleared Swaps Customer Accounts). See
generallyNFA MANUAL, supra note 150, § 16 (mirroring the previously men-
tioned provisions).
170 Filler, supra note 41, at 5.
171 This level is known as the Targeted Residual Interest. See FUTURES
INDUS. ASSN, supra note 126, at 78. 
172 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(g)(2) (2015) (futures); id. §§ 22.3(b)(c) (cleared swaps). 
173 See Filler, supra note 41, at 6.
174 17 C.F.R. § 22.3(c)(1) (2010).
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It is typical for customer margin to be deposited in an account
that is controlled by the CCP,175 because it will have faster access
to use the margin of defaulting customers and FCMs in an emer-
gency situation. The CCP must identify the margin of customers
depositing in Cleared Swaps Customer Accounts.176 This is not a
requirement for Customer Segregated Accounts.177
If the FCMs customer margin account is held on the books of
the CCP, the risk exists under the Futures Model that the CCP
will use the margin of non-defaulting customers in a double de-
fault situation. This risk does not arise under the LSOC Model,
as the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the CCP from using customer
margin that can be identified.
VII. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR POSTING AND HOLDING MARGIN
A. Title Transfer Versus SecurityInterest
Traditionally, there are two broad legal mechanisms for post-
ing margin: title transfer or security interest. In a title transfer 
arrangement, the collateral taker receives full ownership of 
the collateral178 and receives proprietary rights in the trans-
ferred assets.
In its place [the collateral giver] acquires a contractualright
to the return of equivalent assets if the liabilities are dis-
charged, namely assets that, in an economic sense, are identi-
calto the collateral that was originally posted (for example, in
the case of securities, securities of the same series and nom-
inal value), although not necessarily precisely the same assets
that were delivered.179
This legal arrangement allows the collateral taker to reuse or re-
hypothecate the collateral for its own purposes in investments
that are expected to be profitable. Re-hypothecation is the practice
175 As opposed to being deposited with a third-party custodian, as ex-
plained below.
176 See 17 C.F.R. § 22.2(f).
177 See generally17 C.F.R. § 1.23 (2015).
178 Fausto Giacomet, Is the ordinarytreatment ofclient assets in prime bro-
kerage consistent with the recognition ofa trust upon insolvency ofthe prime
broker?, 8 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 205, 210 (2013).
179 SIMON FIRTH, DERIVATIVES LAW & PRACTICE 69 (2008) (emphasis added). 
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of a collateral taker using, for its own purposes,180 customer
securities that have been transferred through a title transfer
arrangement.181 This practice would normally leave customers
with a contractual right against the collateral taker for the return
of their margin, as it is no longer possible to identify the trans-
ferred securities. Consequently, the collateral giver assumes the
credit risk of the collateral taker, and is left as an unsecured cred-
itor for the return of the collateral upon the insolvency of the
collateral taker. Collateral takers will charge lower fees or inter-
est rates in exchange for the privilege of being able to reuse the
collateral givers margin. 
In a security interest arrangement, the collateral taker re-
ceives a limited proprietaryinterest in the collateral assets, with-
out allowing it to freely deal with them.... [T]he collateral giver
retain[s] a residual property right in rem known as equity of re-
demption, and therefore the assets under this arrangement would
not be at risk if the collateral taker [becomes] insolvent.182 It
must be possible to continuously identify the customer margin
for this type of arrangement to be valid.
The legal structure for posting margin in the U.S. futures
and cleared swaps markets under the statutory regime is slightly
more complicated because the client margin can reside at both
the CCP and the clearing member.183 The following section will
analyze the sui generis statutory trust that was created by the
CEA and the DFA to protect customers.
B. The StatutoryTrust
Although futures and cleared swaps transactions are con-
tractual obligations, the margin that is posted to secure these
180 Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, The (sizable)Role ofRe-hypothecation
in the Shadow Banking System 3 (IMF Monetary and Cap. Mkt. Dept., Working
Paper No. WP/10/172, 2010).
181 Clients who permit rehypothecation of their collateral may be compen-
sated either through a lower cost of borrowing or a rebate on fees. Dictionary
Definition, Rehypothecation, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms
/r/rehypothecation.asp [https://perma.cc/434A-Q9Z2].
182 Giacomet, supra note 178, at 210 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
183 DAVID MURPHY, OTC DERIVATIVES: BILATERAL TRADING & CENTRAL
CLEARING: AN INTRODUCTION TO REGULATORY POLICY, MARKET IMPACT AND
SYSTEMIC RISK, GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS SERIES 164 (2013).
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contractual obligations receives proprietary protections under a
trust structure.
1. The StatutoryTrust for Futures Customers
The CEA has created a sui generis statutory trust in order to
protect futures customers. This innovative hybrid legal structure,
which developed in a piecemeal fashion over time, incorporates
elements of trust law, title transfer arrangements, security inter-
ests, and the market practices of CCPs.184
Under the Futures Model, futures customers transfer their
margin in a structure that is akin to a title transfer arrange-
ment, and they have a contractualclaim for the return of their
margin.185 Moreover, the CCP is a super priority creditor with a 
security interest over all the margin deposited in the Customer
Segregated Account.186
In a double default situation, the CCPs security interest at-
taches to all the customer margin and provides it with a claim in
priority over the claims of all other creditors. The CCPs default 
184 The possibility of a hybrid legal structure was confirmed by the Report
on Margin Segregation. It noted that under a title transfer arrangement,
the customers
would forfeit their proprietary interests in such margin imme-
diately upon such transfer .... The customers ... would retain
only a contractual claim against the transferees for the return
of the margin so transferred, not a proprietary interest therein.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, where customers have trans-
ferred title to their margin, it may nevertheless be possible for
CMs to establish trust or security interest arrangements that
would allow customers to establish proprietary interests in the
margin or the contractual obligation of the holder of margin
to return such margin to the CM (as agent or customer for
the customers).
REPORT ON MARGIN SEGREGATION, supra note 36, at 25.
185 Id. (noting that a title transfer arrangement would give rise to a con-
tractual claim and not a property interest). This must be the case if securities
margin is subsequently re-hypothecated.
186 Super-priority creditors are a special class of creditor who are paid before 
all the other creditors of the insolvent counterparty. Christian Chamorro-
Courtland, The LegalAspects ofNon-FinancialMarket CentralCounterparties,
27 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 553, 555 n.12 (2012) [hereinafter Chamorro-
Courtland, LegalAspects].
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waterfall permits it to recover the margin of the defaulting cus-
tomers from the collective margin pool, even if the remaining
margin technically belongs to the non-defaulting customers.187
Consequently, the non-defaulting customers are not protected from
claims of the CCP, and will share any losses on a pro rata basis.
After sharing any losses in the account, futures customers are
provided with equitable proprietaryrights to recover any remain-
ing margin in the account from the bankruptcy trustee in priority
to the insolvent FCMs other general creditors.188 In sum, futures
customers have contractual rights vis-à-vis the CCP, and equi-
table proprietary rights vis-à-vis the insolvent FCMs other gen-
eral creditors; hence, the sui generis nature of the trust.
2. The StatutoryTrust for ClearedSwaps Customers
Under the LSOC Model, cleared swaps customers transfer their
margin in a structure that is akin to a security interest arrange-
ment.189 Moreover, the CCP is a super-priority creditor with a 
security interest over customer margin.190 The CCP, however, is
only allowed to use the margin of the defaulting customers.191 The
new statutory trust created by the DFA provides non-defaulting
cleared swaps customers with a higher level of protection.192
The non-defaulting customers will receive equitable proprietary
rights193 from the moment they transfer their margin to the FCM
or CCP (and not contractual rights). They will have priority over
the CCP and the insolvent FCMs general creditors to recover all 
187 Bora Yagiz, Clearinghouses default waterfall offers no panacea against 
their potentialfailure, REUTERS: FIN. REG. FORUM (Apr. 10, 2014), http://blog
.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/clearinghouses-default-waterfall-offers-no-pan
acea-against-their-potential-failure/ [https://perma.cc/39NC-85V8].
188 11 U.S.C. § 766(i) (2012).
189 M. Holland West & Matthew K. Kerfoot, Symposium: The Impact ofDodd-
Frankon Derivatives, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 269, 278 (2013).
190 Chamorro-Courtland, LegalAspects, supra note 186.
191 West & Kerfoot, supra note 189.
192 Gabriel D. Rosenberg & Jai R. Massari, Regulation ThroughSubstitution
as PolicyTool: Swap Futurization Under Dodd-Frank, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 667, 726 (2013).
193 11 U.S.C. § 766(i).
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identifiable margin deposits.194 In sum, the CCP is strictly pro-
hibited from using the margin of the non-defaulting customers
in a double default situation.
C. Permitted Investments for Customer Excess Margin
There is an important exception to the segregation require-
ment. CFTC Regulation 1.25 allows FCMs and CCPs to invest the
excess margin of futures customers and cleared swaps customers
in a list of permitted investments195 so that the margin is not
sitting idle.
CCPs and FCMs shall bear sole responsibility for any losses 
resulting from the investment of customer funds.196 The law
provides futures customers and cleared swaps customers with a
different level of protection.
1. Investment andRe-hypothecation ofFutures
Customer Margin
The FCM and the CCP may only invest excess futures cus-
tomer margin in a limited list of permitted investments contained 
in CFTC Regulation 1.25: they may re-hypothecate197 customer se-
curities that are highly liquid198 and invest customer money199
in U.S. government bonds.200 CCPs and FCMs can retain any in-
terest or income that they generate from these investments.201
CFTC Regulation 1.25(b)(1) requires that permitted invest-
ments must be highly liquid such that they have the ability to 
be converted into cash within one business day without material
194 Id.
195 See 17 C.F.R. § 1.25 (2015). The CFTC can amend this list from time to
time. In response to various FCM failures, the list was amended in December
2011 to only permit investment in instruments that are guaranteed by the
U.S. government. See Markham, supra note 2, at 124.
196 17 C.F.R. § 1.29(b) (2015) (futures); id. § 22.2(e)(1) (cleared swaps).
197 17 C.F.R. § 1.25(a)(2)(i).
198 See id. § 1.25(a)(2)(ii)(A).
199 Id. § 1.25(a).
200 The law does not appear to allow other permitted depositories that hold
customer margin accounts to invest or re-hypothecate customer margin. 7 U.S.C.
§ 6d(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 1.25.
201 17 C.F.R. § 1.29(a) (2014).
648 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:609
discount in value.202 The Bankruptcy Code requires the trustee
to liquidate any non-identifiable assets and return them to custom-
ers in the form of cash.203 This practice is therefore consistent
with a title transfer arrangement.
Legal scholars have debated whether customers are able to
receive protection under a trust if their securities margin is re-
hypothecated. Markham has argued that the practice of re-
hypothecating customer margin is [a]t variance with traditional 
trust principles.204 Giacomet has also argued that re-hypotheca-
tion is not compatible with traditional trust law principles, as it
is no longer possible to identify the securities that have been trans-
ferred (i.e., they are non-identifiable).205
The Author argues to the contrary that re-hypothecation will
not invalidate a trust. As a persuasive authority, the English
High Court held in Pearson & Ors v. Lehman Brothers Finance
S.A.206 that there was still certainty of subject matter necessary
for a valid trust after Lehman Brothers207 re-hypothecated the
margin of its customers.208
The sui generis statutory trust created by the CEA therefore
provides futures customers with equitable proprietary rights upon
the insolvency of their FCM. Nevertheless, futures customers
202 Id. § 1.25(b)(1).
203 Treatment of Customer Property, 11 U.S.C. §§ 766(e)(3), (h)(1) (2012).
204 Markham, supra note 2, at 96.
205 Giacomet has criticized prime brokerage agreements, and argues that
[i]t is easy for hedge funds to benefit from the recognition of a
trust upon prime broker becomes insolvency ... even though this
is inconsistent with the treatment of client assets in the ordi-
nary course of business .... Prime brokerage clients have clear
reasons to convert their proprietary interests in their assets 
into personal rights claims against their intermediary. None-
theless, upon insolvency and by means of a trust, these clients
are being able to benefit from proprietary entitlements that they
have rejected outside of an insolvency event .... [T]here seems
to be a certain hypocrisy when hedge funds argue that their
property is held on trust .... [T]rust law appears to be in a con-
fused state.
Giacomet, supra note 178, at 219, 221.
206 [2010] EWHC (ch) 2914 (Eng.).
207 Id.
208 See Giacomet, supra note 178, at 217.
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will still be exposed to investment risk,209 operational risk, and
fellow customer risk.
In a shortfall situation, losses are mutualized between all the
customers. Futures customers may claim a pro rata share of the
remaining cash proceeds of the re-hypothecated securities after
the CCP has been paid and in priority to the insolvent FCMs 
other general creditors.210
2. Investment and Re-hypothecation ofCleared Swaps
Customer Margin
Under the DFA, the FCM211 and CCP212 may invest excess
cleared swaps customer margin in the same list of investments
permitted under CFTC Regulation 1.25. The law is different,
however, as the FCM and CCP must treat customer margin as 
belonging to such Cleared Swaps Customer.213 The FCM must
credit any accruals resulting from invested or re-hypothecated 
margin to the customer,214 and is not permitted to use and keep
any interest or income generated from re-hypothecated margin.
In this sense, it is not a true re-hypothecation. The economic ef-
fect is akin to a security interest arrangement.215
The statutory trust provides cleared swaps customers with
equitable proprietary rights to recover the proceeds of the re-
hypothecated margin in priority to the CCP and the insolvent
209 Investment risk occurs when customer margin that is used in permitted 
investments by the FCM faces insurmountable losses and results in a short-
fall. This situation can arise where a bankruptcy trustee incurs losses in liq-
uidating collateral held in the ... [c]ustomer [a]ccount in which the FCM had
invested in accordance with Commission Rule 1.25, FUTURES INDUS. ASSN,
supra note 126, at 10.
210 Id. at 15; Walter Lukken, The Regulation of Futures and Derivatives,
Panel at the A.B.A. Derivatives and Futures Law Annual Program: Exchange
and Clearing Issues (June 23, 2010).
211 17 C.F.R. § 22.2(e)(1) (2012).
212 Id. § 22.3(d).
213 Id. § 22.15.
214 Id. § 22.2(f)(2)(ii).
215 It should be noted that customers do not have a security interest in the
re-hypothecated securities, however, as it is not possible to identify the trans-
ferred assets. Fausto Giacomet has noted in the context of security interest
arrangements that if a right of use is conferred to the collateral taker, the eq-
uity of redemption is eliminated when this right of use is exercised. Giacomet, 
supra note 178, at 21011. 
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FCMs other general creditors. The insolvency trustee will have 
to return all of the invested cash and the cash proceeds of liqui-
dated securities that were re-hypothecated.216 Alternatively, the
customer may request that the trustee return like-kind securi-
ties.217 This means that customers are not exposed to fellow-
customer risk, as there is no mutualization of excess margin.218
As with futures customers, however, the cleared swaps cus-
tomers remain exposed to investment risk if the re-hypothecated
securities have lost value and the FCM or CCP is insolvent. The
FIA has noted that excess funds, wherever held, are subject to
the pro rata distribution provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in
the event of a shortfall in a defaulting FCMs Cleared Swaps 
Customer Account.219
3. CollateralTransformation
Re-hypothecation is necessary for the process of collateral 
transformation.220 This may be necessary in situations where the
FCM accepts a wider range of collateral from customers than is
actually accepted by the CCP. The FCM will need to transform 
this collateral into a type of valid collateral that will be accepted
with the CCP.221
4. Observations and Recommendations
In sum, the U.S. legislative provisions contained in the CEA
and the DFA for protecting futures and cleared swaps customers
are sui generis legal structures that incorporate various (sometimes
216 17 C.F.R. § 1.25(b)(1) (2014).
217 Id. § 190.08(d)(ii)(3).
218 ICE Trust has noted that
if [a] customer fails to pay, ICE Trust will have the right to
access that customers assets that are in the Excess Omnibus 
Account. (This does not mutualize losses across other clients
since ICE Trust will have no right to use the assets in the Ex-
cess Omnibus Account that belong to any other customer.).
REPORT ON MARGIN SEGREGATION, supra note 36, at 58 n.84.
219 FUTURES INDUS. ASSN, supra note 126, at 15 (emphasis added).
220 See generallyMURPHY, supra note 183, at 162.
221 For example, ICE Trust permits this practice. See ICE, ICE TRUST U.S.
CLEARING HOUSE FOR CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS (CDS), https://www.theice.com
/publicdocs/clear_us/ICE_Trust_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/26YS-BHJN].
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conflicting)222 legal concepts. Any legal incongruities should not
diminish the legality of the statutory trust.
VIII. THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF OMNIBUS ACCOUNTS
The applicable bankruptcy rules differ in their treatment of
customer margin deposited in the various customer margin ac-
count classes upon the bankruptcy of the FCM. There are two
types of omnibus accounts: those in which customers intend to
share losses as co-owners on a pro rata basis (the Futures Model),
and those in which customers intend to have their margin treated
as legally separate (the LSOC Model).223 The distinction becomes
important in a double default situation.224 The legal literature
reviewed above, however, has failed to clarify that omnibus ac-
counts may take two different legal forms.
A. The Blended Fund Theory
In some omnibus accounts, the intention is to treat all the
customer margin that is deposited in the account as a single
blended fund.225 This arises if the customers opt to hold their
margin in a single account as co-owners for cost-saving or admin-
istrative purposes. The blended fund theory views the margin
deposited in the account as
an indistinguishable mixture ofvalue, and so it is impossible
to say which part is any claimants .... [The] individual deposits 
lose their identity in the increased balance. The result of the
222 For instance, in the case of futures customers, it is inconsistent with a
trust arrangement for the FCM and CCP to receive the interest and income
generated from investing and rehypothecating excess customer margin instead
of the customer.
223 The type of account used is less important in situations where the cus-
tomer margin deposited in an omnibus account is all properly accounted for
after the FCMs insolvency. In those cases, the customers should receive the 
full value of the margin in priority to the FCMs other unsecured creditors in 
accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 766(h)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
224 Linklaters has noted that the LSOC Model differs from the traditional 
futures approach ... in how it handles [d]ouble [d]efaults. LINKLATERS, supra
note 12, at 3.
225 Wayne L. Townsend, Constructive Trusts and BankCollections, 39 YALE
L.J. 980, 98384 (1930). 
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loss of identityof deposits is that withdrawals cannot be defin-
itively ascribed to any particular deposit.226
It has been observed that omnibus accounts using the Fu-
tures Model have followed the blended fund theory.227 CCPs that
clear futures contracts have developed market practices that
treat futures customer margin deposited in a Customer Segre-
gated Account as an indistinguishable mixture of value that
loses its identity once it is commingled with the margin of the
other customers.
From a legal perspective, the futures customers hold the
margin on a collective basis and own the commingled margin as
co-owners.228 All risks are mutualized between them. In sup-
port of this observation, the CFTC Report notes that DCOs treat 
each FCMs customer account on an omnibus basis, that is, as be-
longing to an undifferentiated group of customers.229 Moreover,
the CSA has noted that the primary argument for allowing mutu-
alisation of fellow customer risk is the potential for lower costs.230
This type of account can present problems for some customers
in a double default situation. If there is insufficient margin held
in the FCMs proprietary account at the CCP to cover the obliga-
tions of the defaulting customer, then the CCP is permitted to use
futures customer margin that it holds in a Customer Segregated
Account to cover. This will affect the margin of all futures cus-
tomers holding margin in that account, and they will have to share
in any shortfall on a pro rata basis.
This also means that any losses arising from investment risk,
fraud committed by the FCM or CCP, or other operational risks
resulting in a shortfall of margin in the omnibus account cannot
be ascribed to any particular customer. In the event that the FCM
holding the omnibus account became insolvent, the insolvency
trustee would also have to distribute to customers the remaining
margin in the omnibus account on a pro rata basis.
226 LIONEL SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING 195, 185 (1997) (emphasis added).
227 See generallyMichael Rawson, 3 Trends Toward Lower-Fee Investments,
MORNINGSTAR (June 12, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.morningstar.com/cover
/videocenter.aspx?id=651309 [https://perma.cc/F6GG-WEYU].
228 Accounts for Clearing Securities Futures, 75 SEC Docket 1505, 1561
(2001).
229 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6339 (emphasis added).
230 CSA CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 7, at 19.
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1. The Blended Fund Theoryandthe Market Practices
ofCCPs
An insolvency trustee must apply section 766 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code231 to distribute customer margin upon the in-
solvency of an FCM. Section 766(h) specifies that
the trustee shall distribute customer property ratablyto custom-
ers on that basis and to the extent of such customers allowed 
net equity232 claims, and in priority to all other claims .... Such
distribution shall be in the form of(1) cash; (2) the return or
transfer ... of specificallyidentifiable customer securities, prop-
erty or commodity contracts[.]233
Section 766(e) requires the trustee to liquidate any com-
modity contract that cannot be identified with a particular 
customer234 and distribute the proceeds in the form of money.235
Therefore, customer margin that is not specifically identifiable,
including securities,236 will be distributed as cash among all the
customers on a pro rata basis.
CCPs that clear futures contracts in the United States do not
keep records237 that identify individual customer margin deposits
231 11 U.S.C. § 766 (2012).
232 This is the amount obtained after close-out netting. 17 C.F.R. § 190.07(b)
(2012) (Net equity means the total claim of a customer against the estate of 
the debtor based on the commodity contacts held by the debtor for or on be-
half of such customer less any indebtedness of the customer to the debtor.).  
233 11 U.S.C. § 766(h) (emphasis added).
234 Id. § 766(e) (Subject to subsection (b) of this section, the trustee shall 
liquidate any commodity contract that ... (2) cannot be transferred ... or (3) can-
not be identified to a particular customer.). 
235 Id. Furthermore, [t]he trustee shall reduce to money, consistent with
good market practice, all securities and other property, other than commodity
contracts, held as property of the estate, except for specifically identifiable
securities or property distributable under subsection (h) ... of this section. 
See id. § 766(f) (emphasis added).
236 The Supervisors of the Major OTC Derivatives Dealers note that the 
sharing rules applicable to commodity customers of insolvent FCMs in the
event of a shortfall in a Bankruptcy Code proceeding do not differ on the basis
of whether margin was posted in the form of securities or cash. REPORT ON MAR-
GIN SEGREGATION, supra note 36, at 53.
237 The CFTC Report has noted that information about the customers as a 
whole, and about each individual customers positions, are [sic] transmitted to 
the DCO every day [under the LSOC Model], an information flow (and store)
that is not present in the Futures Model. CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6340.
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under their current market practices,238 as there is no express
requirement to do so under the CEA or CFTC Regulations.239 The
law only requires CCPs to identify the omnibus account as be-
longing to the futures customers collectively.240 Due to the lack
of records, CCPs are unable to identify the margin deposits of in-
dividual customers. The Author argues that CCPs adopted the
blended fund theory in the futures markets as a part of their mar-
ket practices, in order to take advantage of sections 766(e) and
(h) of the Bankruptcy Code.241
This practice allows CCPs to avoid the cost of maintaining
updated records on individual customer margin deposits, as this
process requires receiving a continuous flow of information from
the FCMs.242 It also provides CCPs with a larger default water-
fall, as the CCP can use the margin of a non-defaulting customer
in a double default situation243 in order to meet its obligations to
the other CMs.
Therefore, it is not surprising that some major CCPs have
demonstrated support for adopting the Futures Model in the
context of the cleared swaps industry.244 They have argued that
the benefits of eliminating fellow customer risk under the LSOC
Model are outweighed by the costs and the Futures Model has 
served the futures industry well for many decades.245
238 The CCP will only be aware of the total amount that it is owed by the
FCM after marking to market at end of day. The CCP will not know the indi-
vidual sums of margin that are owed by the individual customers to their FCM.
239 17 C.F.R. § 39.13(g)(8)(i)(B) (2012).
240 Id. § 1.20(g).
241 11 U.S.C. § 766 (2012).
242 Id.
243 See CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6340:
Under the Futures Model, the DCO could use the entirety of
the FCMs customer account (or as much of it as necessary) to 
meet the entire loss created by the default. Transfer of cus-
tomer positions would be difficult, in that the DCO would lack
information as to which customers were in default, and which
positions belonged to defaulting customers (and, presumably,
would not be transferred) and which did not. The DCO would
be permitted to liquidate customer positions, a process which
might take between one and ten days.
244 These CCPs were CME and ICE. Id. at 6344 n.54.
245 Id. at 6341. It has been argued that LSOC will introduce legal uncertainty,
as it has not been tested in the cleared swaps markets:
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Ultimately, the LSOC Model would impose additional costs
on FCMs and CCPs that they would have to forward on to con-
sumers.246 For example, one DCO estimated that it would have
to increase the amount of collateral that each Cleared Swaps
Customer must provide by 60 percent if it could no longer access
the collateral of non-defaulting Cleared Swaps Customers to cure
certain defaults.247
2. Allocating Losses for a Double Default Under the
Futures Model
Under the Futures Model, customers holding margin in an om-
nibus Customer Segregated Account will share risk as co-owners;
consequently, losses are allocated on a pro rata basis248 among all
the customers in a double default situation, including the non-
defaulting customers.249
CME argued that the Futures Model provides the best balance
of costs versus industry risk as a whole and is the only ap-
proach that provides both legal and operational certainty to all
parties in the event of an FCM default. According to CME, 
the [LSOC Model] imperfectly protects customer collateral and
thus, the Commission [should] not rush to implement a solu-
tion that gives superficial comfort, but may not work either 
operationally or legally in the event of an actual default. 
Id. at 6345. These comments, however, leave room for criticism, since returning
identifiable property to non-defaulting customers in an insolvency situation
has not proven to be a complicated process in past insolvencies.
246 Id. at 6341:
[S]ome DCOs may have anticipated including collateral from
non-defaulting Cleared Swaps Customers as an element in
their financial resources packages. If DCOs no longer have ac-
cess to such collateral, then those DCOs would need to obtain
additional financial resources to meet proposed Commission
requirements. Both FCMs and DCOs averred that the costs
associated with obtaining such additional financial resources
may be substantial, and would ultimately be borne by Cleared
Swaps Customers.
247 Id. at 6341 n.30.
248 11 U.S.C. §§ 766(h), (i)(1) (2012).
249 If a Double Default were to occur, the DCO would have recourse to the 
property of any customers of the FCM in the same account class, including
non-defaulting customers. LINKLATERS, supra note 12, at 3.
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The insolvency trustee has access to resources in the following
order. First, the trustee will liquidate the remaining proprietary
assets of the insolvent FCM and cover the obligations of the de-
faulting customers by paying the CCP from the FCMs remaining 
assets.250 Second, if there is still a debt owing from the defaulting
customers to the CCP, then the CCP can access its default water-
fall to use the collective margin deposited in the Customer Segre-
gated Account.251 This will affect the margin of both the defaulting
and non-defaulting customers.
Third, once all the obligations to the CCP have been covered,
the insolvency trustee will distribute any margin remaining in
the Customer Segregated Account to the customers that have
claims.252 This distribution process will require the insolvency
trustee to close out and liquidate253 all open futures contracts
and convert any securities margin into cash for a ratable distri-
bution to all the margin customers.254
For example, A, B, C, and D are customers that each deposit
$25 million as an initial margin in a Customer Segregated Account
with their FCM for futures transactions that they have entered
into. The account contains a total of $100 million. Customer A
experiences a catastrophic loss of $50 million in its futures posi-
tions due to unexpected volatility in the financial markets; as a
result, it owes the FCM an additional $25 million in variation
margin, which it is unable to pay.
The following actions will take place in sequence: first, the
FCM will use $25 million of initial margin belonging to A in the
margin account to pay the CCP. Second, as this amount is not
enough to cover As obligations, the FCM must use its own propri-
etary assets, of which it only has a total of $13 million, after hav-
ing experienced heavy losses itself. Since the FCMs proprietary 
250 The CME Rulebook allows the CCP to reimburse customers of any account
type for any losses experienced to customer margin from the proprietary as-
sets of the CM. CME RULEBOOK, supra note 14, at 11 (Rule 802.G(6) states that
[u]pon liquidating the defaulting clearing members proprietary account, any 
remaining collateral may be applied by the clearing house to losses remaining
in the defaulting clearing members customer account classes.). 
251 See id. at 7, 11.
252 11 U.S.C. §§ 766(h)(j) (2012). 
253 The futures contract will not be closed out if the customer notifies the
FCM of its intention to deliver the physical commodity. Id. § 766(b).
254 Id. §§ 766(f), (h)(1).
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assets are insufficient to pay the remaining $12 million to the
CCP, this debt causes the FCM to default on its obligations to the
CCP, resulting in a double default. Third, there is a shortfall of
$12 million, a loss that is collectively shared between A, B, C, and
D on a pro rata basis as co-owners. Because the CCP is unable to
identify which customer defaulted on its obligations, the CCP 
will access the Customer Segregated Account to assume the loss,
leaving only $63 million in the account when there should be
$75 million. B, C and D suffer a loss of $4 million each.255 The
remaining $63 million of customer margin will be distributed
evenly between B, C and D; in other words, they each receive
$21 million from the insolvency trustee.
The allocation of losses in this situation would have been the
same if the shortfall in customer margin had been sustained from
operational risk or fraudulent misappropriations committed by
the depository or the CCP.256
3. Problems Associated withthe BlendedFund Theory
The blended fund theory presents three problems. First, this
theory is incompatible with the language used in the CEA. The
FCM257 and the CCP258 are prohibited from using the margin 
of one futures customer to guarantee or secure the obligations of
another futures customer. The Author speculates that CCPs have
purposefully refused to keep records on individual customer mar-
gin deposits. The CCP cannot ensure that the margin of one cus-
tomer will not be used to cover the losses of another customer if
they are unable to identify each individual customers margin de-
posits in their records. The CCP is a super priority creditor with 
respect to the customer margin account.259 It is not concerned
255 As margin was already exhausted by the FCM. 
256 11 U.S.C. § 764(a) (2012). Section 764(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that any transfer by the ... [FCM] that, but for such transfer, would have been 
customer property, may be avoided by the [insolvency] trustee, and such prop-
erty shall be treated as customer property. Id. Notwithstanding, in order to
protect the integrity of the market, the CFTC has the discretion to uphold the
finality of transactions by ensuring that any misappropriated margin that is
used in cleared transactions will not be undone. See id. § 764(b).
257 See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2) (2012).
258 See 17 C.F.R. § 39.15(b)(1) (2015).
259 See Chamorro-Courtland, LegalAspects, supra note 186, at 555.
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with identifying which customers defaulted on their obligations
and which customers are subsidizing the resulting losses. The CCP
is concerned merely with using the customer margin to pay its obli-
gations to the creditor CMs, which is its primary obligation under
the clearing arrangement.260
Second, it is observed that FCMs are required to expressly no-
tify customers in the contract for opening a futures account that
they are exposed to fellow customer risk. For example, Trade-
Station Securities Inc., a registered FCM, has highlighted in its
account agreement that
[t]he funds you deposit with a futures commission merchant
are not held by the futures commission merchant in a sepa-
rate account for your individual benefit. Futures commission
merchants commingle the funds received from customers in
one or more accounts and you may be exposedto losses incurred
byother customers if the futures commission merchant does
not have sufficient capital to cover such other customers 
trading losses.261
Arguably, sharing risk as co-owners in the omnibus account
goes against the intention of the CEA. It is also inequitable,
because customers are not provided with the option of choosing
the level of protection that their margin should receive.262
Furthermore, imposing co-ownership risk on futures customers
and protecting cleared swaps customers from fellow customer risk
260 See generallyCraig Pirrong, Mutualization of Default Risk, Fungibility,
and Moral Hazard: the Economics of Default Risk Sharing in Cleared and Bilat-
eral Markets 3334 (Univ. of Notre Dame, Working Paper, Feb. 2010), http:// 
business.nd.edu/uploadedFiles/Academic_Centers/Study_of_Financial_Regula
tion/pdf_and_documents/clearing_moral_hazard_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X7V
-A76K]; see also CRAIG PIRRONG, ISDA, THE ECONOMICS OF CENTRAL CLEARING
79, 1314 (May 2011), https://www2.isda.org/attachment/MzE0Ng==/ISDA
discussion_CCP_Pirrong.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RQG-BABZ].
261 TRADESTATION SECS., FUTURES ACCOUNT APPLICATION BOOKLET 2, http://
www.tradestation.com/~/media/Files/TradeStation/Account%20Forms/Account
%20Applications/TSS/Futures/Futures%20Individual%20and%20Joint%20Ap
plication.ashx [https://perma.cc/6QAJ-EMQP] [hereinafter TRADESTATION,
BOOKLET] (emphasis added).
262 The Supervisors of the Major OTC Derivatives Dealers note that [t]his 
mutualized sharing regime among customers cannot be varied by contract. 
REPORT ON MARGIN SEGREGATION, supra note 36, at 34.
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appears unjust when the language used in the legislation is nearly
identical. The CFTC has acknowledged this by directing staff to 
look into the possibility of adopting the [LSOC Model] for the fu-
tures market. The Commission remains committed to protecting
the market participants.263
Third, porting is hindered under the Futures Model, since it is
not possible to identify the margin deposits of individual custom-
ers for immediate transfer. This contradicts the policy requiring
FCMs and CCPs to be able to immediately transfer customer mar-
gin upon the insolvency of the FCM.264
B. The Distinguishable Fund Theory
In some omnibus accounts, the intention is to treat the cus-
tomer margin that is deposited in the account as a distinguish-
able fund.265 This arises when the customers intend to have their
funds operationally commingled and legally segregated. Under
the distinguishable fund theory, individual deposits retain their
identity in the increased balance. The balance is seen as com-
posed of a series of debts .... [W]ithdrawals can be ascribed to
particular deposits.266
This theory requires the FCM and CCP to keep accurate
and up-to-date records of each individual margin deposit and with-
drawal made into and out of the omnibus account by each in-
dividual customer.267 This recordkeeping allows the FCM and CCP
to identify268 the margin of each customer from a legal stand-
point.269 The daily flow of information and storage of information
263 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6349.
264 See S. REP. NO. 94-989, at 8 (1978).
265 See generallySMITH, supra note 226, at 18385; see also INV. CO. INST.,
NAVIGATING INTERMEDIARY RELATIONSHIPS 3, 7 (Sept. 2009), https://www.ici
.org/pdf/ppr_09_nav_relationships.pdf [https://perma.cc/B53F-JK4E].
266 SMITH, supra note 226, at 185 (emphasis added).
267 See CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6339, 6352, 6368.
268 17 C.F.R. § 190.01(ll)(1) (2015) (defining specifically identifiable property 
as property received, acquired, or held by or for the account of the debtor from 
or for the account of a customer to margin, guarantee or secure and open com-
modity contract). 
269 The CME Group has noted in its clearing rules that [t]he Clearing House 
shall rely on its own books and records to identifythe portfolio of rights and
obligations arising from the positions of each cleared swaps customer. CME
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by the CCP means that it is less reliant on the FCM during an
emergency.270
The DFA has responded to the market practices of CCPs in
the futures industry. The new law requires CCPs to identify and
keep updated records of individual customer margin deposits.271 It
has achieved this goal by introducing the distinguishable fund the-
ory to omnibus accounts holding cleared swaps customer margin.
The DFA prevents CCPs from taking advantage of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Section 766(c) of the Bankruptcy Code specifies that
[t]he trustee shall return promptly to a customer any specifically
identifiable security, property, or commodity contract to which
such customer is entitled, or shalltransfer, on such customers be-
half, such security, property, or commodity contract to a commod-
ity broker that is not a debtor under this title.272 Consequently,
the distinguishable fund theory prohibits CCPs from using the
margin of non-defaulting cleared swaps customers in a double
default situation.273 In the event that the FCM holding the om-
nibus account became insolvent, the insolvency trustee would
transfer or return all identifiable margin to the non-defaulting
customers.274 CCPs can only use the identifiable margin of the
defaulting customers to cover their respective obligations to the
FCM.275 The distinguishable fund theory therefore facilitates the
RULEBOOK, supra note 14, at 11. CME Group is also complying with the new
CFTC Regulations, noting that [t]he Clearing House shall treat positions and 
collateral of the cleared swaps customers of a clearing member, which has
been declared to be in default, in accordance with Part 22 of the CFTCs regu-
lations. Id.
270 See CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6369.
271 Id. at 633637. 
272 11 U.S.C. § 766(c) (2012) (emphasis added); see also 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(d)
(2015) (re-emphasizing this point).
273 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 633637. 
274 Id. at 6340:
Under the LSOC Model, the DCO could only use the collateral
attributable to defaulting customers (those whose positions
suffered losses) to meet the loss. Thus, all collateral attribut-
able to customer whose net positions gained or were flat 
(neither gained nor lost), and much of the collateral attribut-
able to customers whose net positions lost, would be immedi-
ately available for transfer.
275 The collective obligations of the defaulting customer to the FCM should
correspond directly with the FCMs obligations to the CCP. 
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ability of porting the margin of non-defaulting customers, as the
CCP is able to immediately identify and transfer the margin to a
new solvent CM.
The CFTC has adopted the LSOC model, because the language
used in sections 724 (a)(2)(A) and (B) of the DFA276 is compatible
with the distinguishable fund theory. This requires the CCP and
FCM to identify the margin of individual customers in their
books. The LSOC Model, however, does not mitigate losses aris-
ing from investment risk, operational risk, or fraudulent misap-
propriations277 of customer margin committed by the FCM, the
depository, or the CCP.
In situations in which it is impossible to identify individual
cleared swaps customer margin due to fraud or corrupted records,
the non-defaulting customers may also be required to share any
losses with the defaulting customers on a pro rata basis, unless
they were able to trace and recover their margin.278 This occurs
because losses cannot be attributed to any particular customer and
there is uncertainty as to which particular customers margin was 
misappropriated or lost.
1. Allocating Losses for a Double Default Under the
LSOC Model
The LSOC Model279 prohibits the FCM and the CCP from using
the margin, including excess margin, of the non-defaulting cleared
276 See CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6344. The CFTC Report notes that
the LSOC Model is the most appropriate model for Cleared Swaps Customer 
Collateral under § 4d(f) of the CEA. Id. Two prominent FCMs, Fidelity and
Blackrock, have noted that LSOC is supported by the statutory language and 
purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act. Id.
277 In other words, the LSOC Model does not eliminate the MF Global 
problem, which arises when there is a shortfall in the customer margin ac-
count because a bankrupt FCM fraudulently or negligently used or commin-
gled customer margin with its own proprietary assets. See Zachary T. Brumfield,
The Future ofthe CommodityFutures Market: How Customer Segregated Ac-
counts can be Better Protected from Insolvent Futures Commission Merchants,
2.1 GLOBAL MKTS. L.J. 1, 45, 913 (2013). 
278 See LINKLATERS, supra note 12, at 34. 
279 See CME GRP., LSOC AND CME GROUPS VISION FOR CLEARED SWAPS
CUSTOMER PROTECTION 1 (Oct. 2012), https://www.cmegroup.com/clearing
/files/lsoc-and-cme-groups-vision-cleared-swaps-customer-protection.pdf [https://
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swaps customers in a Cleared Swaps Customer Account in a
double default situation. It therefore provides enhanced pro-
tection for cleared swaps customers by eliminating fellow cus-
tomer risk.280 Any losses arising from a double default will have
to be fulfilled from the FCMs proprietary assets and the CCPs 
default waterfall.281
For example, A, B, C, and D are customers that each deposit
$25 million as margin in a Cleared Swaps Customer Account with
their FCM for cleared swaps contracts that they have entered
into. The account contains a total of $100 million. Customer A
experiences a catastrophic loss of $50 million in its cleared swaps
positions due to unexpected volatility in the financial markets.
Customer A therefore owes the FCM an additional $25 million,
which it is unable to pay.
The first and second steps are identical to the scenario
above282 that described the shortfall for futures customers. The
third step is different: the shortfall of $12 million does not affect
B, C, and D, and their margin deposits are not used. The $75
million remaining in the account will be immediately identified
and either ported or distributed to B, C, and D by the insolvency
trustee. Each customer will receive its full deposit of $25 million.
The loss of $12 million will be covered by the CCP from its de-
fault waterfall.
C. Arguments Against the Blended Fund Theoryin the
Futures Markets
Arguably, the Futures Model instills a sense of market disci-
pline and a form of self-regulation, as customers will carefully 
select a reputable FCM. The additional protection afforded by
the LSOC Model may not be required in a properly functioning
market, such as the futures market. Nonetheless, this Article
argues, for various reasons, for replacing the Futures Model with
the LSOC Model in the futures market.
perma.cc/67FX-EL2M]; see also Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 22.1(1), 22.2(a) (2015).
280 See FUTURES INDUS. ASSN, supra note 126, at 810. 
281 See LINKLATERS, supra note 12, at 13. 
282 See supra Part VIII.A.2.
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1. RiskMonitoring
The CCP is in a better position than the futures customers to
monitor the financial exposure of market participants and safe-
guard against the risk of a CM becoming insolvent. The CFTC
Report has recognized this in the context of the swaps markets:
The ability of a swaps customer to determine Fellow-Customer
Risk at a particular FCM is limited, because confidentiality
restraints inherently limit the amount of information that an
FCM can provide customers with respect to the creditworthi-
ness, swaps positions, and, in some cases, even identity of its
other customers. This in turn impairs ... the customers ability 
to evaluate Fellow-Customer Risk, hindering their ability to
manage it, insure against it, or appropriately account for it in
business decision-making.283
This information asymmetry also exists for futures customers.
More importantly, CCPs have an added incentive to closely mon-
itor their CMs under the LSOC Model, since CCPs have fewer
resources under the default waterfall to cover a CM default.284
2. The StatutoryIntention
The mutualization of risk goes against the spirit of the law.
Ignoring the identity of individual customer margin deposits is
an unfair market practice that contradicts the language used in
CFTC Regulation 1.20(g). This provision does not permit CCPs
to use or dispose of such futures customer funds except as be-
longing to such futures customers.285
283 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 636465. 
[T]here are efficiency gains in centralizing FCM monitoring in
a small number of parties. Moreover, because of confidentiality
considerations, among other things, DCOs have greater access
to information from their Clearing Members than Cleared
Swaps Customers do. As a result of this greater access to in-
formation and because of the increased inventive on DCOs to
actively monitor the risks posed by their Clearing Member
FCMs and Cleared Swaps Customers, the overall effectiveness
of risk management may be increased.
Id. at 6365 n.252.
284 See id. at 6368.
285 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(g) (2015).
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Arguably, it is unclear whether this provision continues to
apply to the CCP in situations when the FCM becomes insolvent,
as it is not a part of the Bankruptcy Code. However, this protec-
tion was plausibly intended to apply when the FCM becomes in-
solvent, since it enhances the protection of customer margin.
The CFTC elaborated on the intention of the segregation re-
quirement within the CEA in Dorn v. Shearson Hayden Stone,
Inc., noting that
[t]he language of the statute and its legislative history indicate
that Section 4d [CEA] was designed for the broad purpose of
protecting customers from having their money, securities or
property appropriated by a [FCM], or some other depository,
without adequate legalbasis, and the more specific purpose of
ensuring the integrity of the futures market transactions by a
[FCM] for its own account or for other customers.286
The point of commingling customer margin in an omnibus
account is for convenience287 of the FCM and CCP, not to cover
the obligations that the CCP owes to its CMs. There is nothing
in the statute mentioning that the non-defaulting customers are
required to subsidize the CCP for the obligations it owes to the
creditor CMs in a double default situation. This subsidy would
amount to using non-defaulting customer margin for the CCPs 
own purposes.
Customer margin deposits are regarded as trust funds that
should receive bankruptcy protection from the insolvent FCMs 
general creditors.288 A CCP could be considered a general credi-
tor under the statutory language,289 as it is technically some 
other depository.290 A CCP falls under the list of permitted de-
positories291 that can hold futures customer funds; therefore,
CCPs should not be allowed to use customer margin for their
own purposes.
In support of this view, the CSA argues that [c]ollateral is 
provided by a customer to address the risk associated with a
customers default, not the default of their clearing member or
286 CFTC No. R 77-167, 1981 WL 26035 (Oct. 6, 1981).
287 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)(1) (2015).
288 See Markham, supra note 2, at 94.
289 80 CONG. REC. 7858 (1936).
290 Dorn, 1981 WL 26035, at *3.
291 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(b)(2) (2015).
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other customers.292 The segregation requirement is supposed 
to prohibit the CCP from using customer funds to cover the 
losses of other customers in the same account class in the futures
markets.293 In practice, this has not occurred.
The CFTC Report supports this argument in the context of
cleared swaps:
Prohibiting DCOs from using the collateral of non-defaulting
customers to protect a DCO from risks within a DCOs control 
is consistent with the statutes goalof protecting customer
funds .... By better protecting Cleared Swaps Customer Col-
lateral against fellow-customer risk, the LSOC Model will en-
hance compliance with the values ofCEA Section 4d(f), which
requires that the property of each individual customer be
protected .... The [CFTC] has carefully considered the available
evidence regarding the costs and benefits of [the LSOC Model]
and has concluded that the [LSOC Model] best accomplishes
the statutoryobjectives of protecting customer deposits.294
Surprisingly, the CFTC has not made the same argument for
the protection of futures customers. The same statutory language
is used in sections 4d(a) and (f), which suggests that the statutory
goals and values are the same for cleared swaps and futures
customers. Customers in both markets should receive protection
against fellow customer risk by applying the LSOC Model.
This argument has two limitations. First, the CFTCs com-
ments in Dorn v. Shearson suggest that a depository holding cus-
tomer funds, including a CCP, can use customer margin if there
is an adequate legal basis.295 Arguably, CCPs may have an ade-
quate legal basis to use the funds of non-defaulting customers,
because these customers have given contractual consent to shar-
ing risk as co-owners when they open a futures account.
Second, this Author has previously demonstrated in an article
on Central Counterparties (CCP)and the New Transnational
LexMercatoria296 that CCPs have been allowed by the courts in
292 CSA CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 7, at 24.
293 Dorn, 1981 WL 26035, at *3.
294 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6370 (emphasis added).
295 1981 WL 26035, at *3.
296 See generally Christian Chamorro-Courtland, CentralCounterparties
(CCP)and the New TransnationalLexMercatoria, 10 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV.
57 (2011).
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various common law jurisdictions to contract out of any statutes
that negatively affect the CCP in an insolvency situation. A court
in the United States may hold, therefore, that the CCPs clearing 
rules and practices will take priority over any provisions in the
CEA or Bankruptcy Code that diminish the resources available
in the default waterfall.297
Until the courts or the CFTC provide some clarification over
the conflict between the customer protection rules and the clear-
ing practices of CCPs, there is legal uncertainty regarding the
effect of the CEAs provisions. This issue needs immediate clari-
fication, as any delays caused by litigation during the next finan-
cial crisis may exacerbate systemic risk.
3. PolicyGoals
The CFTCs regulations are promulgated in light of certain 
policy goals. Under section 15(a) of the CEA, the CFTC should
consider the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation before it
is issued. 298 The CFTC must create rules that ensure the finan-
cial integrity, avoid systemic risk, and protect all market 
participants from ... misuses of customer assets.299 It is difficult
to balance these policy goals in an insolvency situation, as there
is typically a finite amount of resources available for distribution.
The Futures Model and CCP market practices suggest that
the preferred policy in the futures markets has been to protect
the financial system from systemic risk by providing CCPs with a
larger default waterfall in the form of full access to futures cus-
tomer margin.300 This practice, however, has come at the expense
of futures customers, who are exposed to fellow customer risk.
Arguably, adoption of the LSOC Model in the futures markets
is more compatible with these policy goals. It provides better pro-
tection for futures customers without increasing systemic risk or
compromising the financial integrity of the futures markets, as
297 It is also possible that a court may find that CCPs are not general
creditors under the statute. There is evidence to suggest that CCPs will be
treated as super priority creditors and provided with access to the margin of 
non-defaulting customers.
298 See 7 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2015).
299 7 U.S.C. § 5(b) (2015); see also id. § 19(a)(2).
300 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6338.
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it merely shifts fellow customer risk from customers to the CCP.
It is possible for CCPs to mitigate and reallocate this risk by re-
quiring customers to post higher levels of initial margin301 and/
or requiring CMs to deposit larger amounts of collateral into the
CCPs guaranty fund.302 Customers, therefore, would experience
an opportunity cost of having to post more margin in exchange for
better protection and lower risk. In this sense, the CFTC Report
has noted that the LSOC Model would function in a manner 
analogous to insurance.303
Moreover, it is unlikely that CCPs will exclusively increase
margin requirements from their CMs and their customers if the
LSOC Model is adopted. The Committee on Payment and Mar-
ket Infrastructures and the International Organization of Secu-
rities Commissions (CPMI-IOSCO) has recommended that [a]ll 
systemically important [CCPs] should have a comprehensive
and effective recovery plan.304
A recovery plan requires a CCP to establish
ex ante contractual arrangements, to address any uncovered
loss, liquidity shortfall or capital inadequacy, whether arising
from participant default or other causes (such as business,
operational or other structural weaknesses), including actions
to replenish any depleted pre-funded financial resources and
liquidity arrangements, as necessary to maintain the [CCPs] 
viability as a going concern and the continued provision of
critical services.305
This means that CCPs should not rely solely on the margin posted
by CMs and their customers in a double default situation. For in-
stance, LCH.Clearnet has recommended that additional resources
could come from, inter alia, assessment powers, variation margin
gains haircutting, and replenishment of the default fund.306
301 CME has warned that customers will have to post $500 billion in margin
to secure their margin positions. Id. at 6364.
302 Id. at 6365.
303 Id. at 6364.
304 COMM. PAYMENT MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES INTL ORG. SEC. COMMN,
RECOVERY OF FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 1 (Oct. 2014), http://www
.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d121.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EQH-9G7H].
305 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
306 LCH.CLEARNET, CCP RISK MANAGEMENT, RECOVERY & RESOLUTION
1719 (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/731485/762448
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4. Co-ownershipIs an Outdated Practice
Arguably, the practice of futures customers holding margin
as co-owners is outdated. This practice made sense when the
segregation requirement was initially created in 1934. Histori-
cally, it was expensive to identify customer margin at all times; 
it was administratively burdensome, or even impossible, for an
FCM to communicate and report to the CCP on the margin depos-
its of individual futures customers on a daily basis.307
This excuse should no longer be accepted in light of techno-
logical advances. The commercialization of computers and the
Internet has increased the speed and decreased the cost of com-
munication.308 In the twenty-first century, it is unfair to expose
futures customers to fellow customer risk and require them to
share risk as co-owners without giving them the option of paying
for a higher level of protection.
5. Losses Are Uncertain Under the Futures Model
The Futures Model creates uncertainty for customers upon
the insolvency of their FCM, as they will not know the amount of
their losses resulting from fellow customer risk. This decreases
confidence in the futures markets and can exacerbate volatility
during periods of market stress.
The LSOC Model reduces this uncertainty, as it facilitates the
porting of margin. The termination of large contractual positions
could lead to increased volatility and liquidity risk in the mar-
kets. The current Futures Model could exacerbate systemic risk
if various customers simultaneously terminate their derivatives
trades upon the insolvency of their FCM. Porting would allow cus-
tomers to transfer their open futures and cleared swaps positions
/final+white+paper+version+three.pdf/1d1700aa-a1ae-4a6c-8f6f-541eec9b7420
[https://perma.cc/9CDB-896K].
307 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6344.
308 The CFTC Report supports this point in the context of cleared swaps:
[T]hough treating futures customer collateral on a collective basis may, at one 
time, have been practically necessary for convenience, such practice is not 
standard in the current swaps market nor is it as critical in an era where ac-
count information is stored and processed on an automated basis. Id. at 6362
n.230 (citing comments made by CME).
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to a solvent FCM without having to close out all their open con-
tractual positions.309
6. CapitalRequirements
The Bank for International Settlements has published guide-
lines for the application of Basel III310 to banks clearing directly
or indirectly with a CCP.311 The guidelines require banks to hold
an additional 2 percent capital if a CCP can use the margin of
non-defaulting customers in a double default situation.312
There are no additional capital requirements for banks that
post customer margin in a manner that is bankruptcy remote 
from the CCP.313 This is possibly the largest incentive to adopt
the LSOC Model in the futures markets, as this change will sig-
nificantly lower capital requirements for banks.
D. Possible Limitations ofAdopting the LSOC Modelin the
Futures Market
1. InstitutionalInvestors
Arguably, the LSOC Model has not been adopted in the futures
industry because most of the market participants are institutional
investors prepared to accept fellow customer risk in exchange for
lower fees from CMs, and therefore do not require the same level
309 Linklaters notes that [w]hile portfolios are portable under the futures 
model, because a DCO has recourse to the collateral of all of a defaulting
FCMs futures customers, any deficiency can significantly hamper porting. 
LINKLATERS, supra note 12, at 3.
310 The Bank for International Settlements has defined Basel III as  
a comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, to strengthen the regula-
tion, supervision and risk management of the banking sector.
These measures aim to: [i]mprove the banking sectors ability 
to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress,
whatever the source[;] [i]mprove risk management and gover-
nance[; and] strengthen banks transparency and disclosures. 
See BANK INTL SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
BANKS, BIS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm [https://perma.cc/6FRX-GZY5].
311 See BIS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 64.
312 Id. ¶ 203, at 7.
313 Id. ¶ 202, at 7.
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of protection as retail customers. This argument, however, does not
explain why the LSOC Model was adopted and widely supported
by market participants in the cleared swaps industry, which is
also used by many institutional investors.
2. Uncertain Costs
The cost of adopting the LSOC Model in the futures industry
is uncertain. Some commentators have suggested that it may
come at a significant expense for futures customers. COOConnect
notes that
CCPs run on remarkably low levels of capital. At the end of
2011, LCH.Clearnet held liabilities valued at 541 billion on 
an equity capital base of 333.1 million, or just 0.06 per cent of 
its liabilities. Of course, CCPs run matched bookswhat one 
member owes is offset exactly by what another member owes
to thembut this is still a worryingly thin capital base.314
CCPs may need to raise additional funds to buttress their de-
fault waterfall.
The following points consider the potential costs of adopting
LSOC. First, ISDA and CME have estimated that implementing the
LSOC Model for cleared swaps will require 60 percent to 90 per-
cent more initial margin than the Futures Model, assuming that
no changes are made to the guaranty fund.315 CME has estimated
that cleared swaps customers will have to post $800 to $900 billion
under the LSOC Model,316 whereas they would only have to post
around $500 billion if the Futures Model were adopted.
Alternatively, CME estimated that it could raise the necessary
resources by doubling the size of the guaranty fund;317 this would
require $100 billion under the LSOC Model or $50 billion under
the Futures Model. If CCPs request additional margin from their
CMs, as a consequence of adopting the LSOC Model in the fu-
tures markets, CMs may pass these costs onto their customers.
314 COOCONNECT, supra note 1.
315 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6365.
316 Id. at 6366.
317 Id.
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Consequently, CMs may charge their customers higher fees and
require them to post more margin.318
Linklaters has mentioned that LSOC may increase swap 
clearing costs due to higher margin, guaranty fund and assess-
ment requirements imposed by DCOs stripped of access to non-
defaulting swap customers margin.319 This comment, however,
is dubious, as CCPs did not have access to non-defaulting swap
customer margin before the financial crisis, as there was no man-
datory clearing requirement for swaps contracts.
Second, COOConnect has noted that CCPs devour collateral.320
This suggests that there could be systemic consequences if CCPs
demand more variation margin from CMs and their customers.
Any increase might force futures customers to exchange more se-
curities for cash in the repo markets, because variation margin
must be posted in the form of cash.
Consequently, a huge increase in the demand for cash raises
the potential for cash shortages and liquidity risk during a finan-
cial crisis; market participants will be less willing to exchange
cash for securities during times of market stress. It is unlikely,
however, that CCPs would increase customer margin require-
ments by a significant amount, as this would cause customers to
move to cheaper competitors in foreign markets.321
A beneficial consequence of introducing the LSOC Model to
the futures market is that it may hinder CCPs from competing
on margin. Dr. David Murphy, the former Head of Risk at the
ISDA, has argued that there is a great temptation for CCPs to
reduce margin: lower margin encourages more trading, and
hence more fees for the clearing house.322 The desire of CCPs to
318 Id.
319 LINKLATERS, supra note 12, at 1.
320 COOCONNECT, supra note 1.
321 There is evidence that customers have begun to switch from CME Group
to LCH.Clearnet due to the lower fees offered by the latter. Joe Rennison,
Investors in Switch from CME to LCH, FIN. TIMES (June 9, 2015), http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cee93f2c-0ea5-11e5-8aca-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3yaa8xdrb
[https://perma.cc/ML8G-VT2B]. Therefore, customers do take into consider-
ation the amount of fees they pay when choosing a CCP. There is no evidence,
however, linking the higher fees at CME Group with the adoption of the
LSOC Model.
322 MURPHY, supra note 183, at 150.
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increase margin requirements would therefore be counterbal-
anced by their desire to compete with lower fees in order to at-
tract more customers.
Third, the CFTC has estimated that the operational costs of
implementing the LSOC Model for the cleared swaps market is
likely to be slightly less than $1 million per year per FCM, with 
one-time costs of about $700,000.323 These costs, however, are
insignificant for large FCMs.
In the CFTC Report, swaps customers have expressed that
they are prepared to pay the costs associated with implementing
the LSOC Model in the cleared swaps market because they desire
the additional protection.324 It is probable that futures customers
would also be prepared to pay the increased costs associated
with implementing the LSOC Model in the futures markets if
they were provided with the same opportunity.
The futures markets are a fraction of the size of the OTC
markets. In December of 2014, the global market for OTC con-
tracts had a notional value of $630 trillion,325 whereas the global
futures and options markets only had a notional value of $64
trillion.326 The costs of implementing LSOC in the futures mar-
kets should therefore be significantly lower.
In support of this argument, LCH.Clearnet, which has been
clearing swaps for over a decade, has noted that the margin levels
and guaranty fund contributions are the same under the Futures
Model and the LSOC Model.327 The operational costs would be 
the same across all [segregation] models being considered given
a requirement for DCOs to collect margin on a gross basis.328
There is no evidence, therefore, suggesting that operational costs
will significantly increase if the LSOC Model is implemented in
the futures markets.
323 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6368.
324 Id. at 6364, 636970. 
325 BANK INTL SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REV. A141 (Sept. 2015),
http://www.bis.org/statistics/dt1920a.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB6E-2DVY].
326 BANK INTL SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REV. A146 (March 2015),
http://www.bis.org/statistics/r_qa1503_hanx23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN7N-Q
HG7].
327 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6366.
328 Id. at 6368.
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3. Double Defaults Are Rare
First, the CFTC Report notes that [b]y their nature, double 
defaults are rare events, though potentially important if they in-
volve major FCMs.329 There have only been two cases of double
defaults by FCMs in the U.S. futures markets in the past two
decades330: Griffin Trading Co.331 and Klein Futures Inc.332
If the risk of a double default occurring in the futures markets
is low, however, there should be no reason for CCPs to raise the
margin requirements for futures customers if the LSOC Model is
adopted. Fellow customer risk will rarely materialize into any
costs for the CCP. The only additional costs for CCPs and FCMs
might be the additional reporting and record keeping of individ-
ual customer margin deposits.
Second, adopting the LSOC Model in the cleared swaps mar-
ket is arguably justified because swaps contracts are riskier than
futures contracts:
A number of commenters suggested that Fellow-Customer
Risk may be greater in the cleared swaps market than in the
futures market because swaps are less liquid than exchange-
traded futures (thereby resulting in greater volatility of prices,
particularly in times of financial stress) and because the
aggregate value of transactions in the swaps market is many
times greater than the aggregate value of transactions in the
futures market.333
In response to these comments, it is noted that LCH.Clearnet
has been clearing interest rate swaps for over a decade, and there
has never been a failure of an FCM relating to the clearing of
swaps.334 Therefore, the different risk profiles between futures
329 Id. at 6364. Linklaters has argued that due to the nature of the segre-
gation regime and the overcollateralization inherent in initial margin require-
ments, it is exceedingly unlikely that a Double-Default would ever actually
occur. LINKLATERS, supra note 12, at 3 n.3.
330 Double defaults are so rare that Professor Filler mistakenly assumed
that there has not been such a shortfall arising from a double default in the 
United States. Filler, supra note 41, at 6.
331 See, e.g., Inskeep v. Griffin, 440 B.R. 148 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
332 See, e.g., CFTC REPORT ON KLEIN & CO., supra note 59.
333 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6364.
334 Id. at 6364 n.245.
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and swaps contracts is a weak argument for justifying the different
levels of protection that customers receive.
E. The Limitations ofthe LSOC Model
There are some situations where a blended fund will unin-
tentionally arise under the LSOC Model. The LSOC Model does
not protect customers from sharing losses on a pro rata basis if
the CCPs or FCMs records are corrupted due to fraud commit-
ted by the FCM or CCP, or where other operational risks lead to
a shortfall. Linklaters has noted that
[t]he LSOC Model does no more to protect customer property
held by an FCM than does the futures market segregation
model ... [C]ustomers under the LSOC Model are just as ex-
posed to the operational and investment risk at the FCM level
as futures customers are.335
Consequently, the LSOC Model only protects cleared swaps cus-
tomers from fellow customer risk if the CCP maintains accurate
records that can identify individual customer margin deposits.
IX. COMPARISON WITH THE U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS
In the context of the securities markets, broker-dealers are
required to segregate customer margin under SEC Rule 15c3-3. 
The securities and margin of customers are commingled into a
specially designated omnibus account that follows the blended
fund model. This rule was introduced in response to the Paper-
work Crisis at the end of the 1960s in order to provide customers 
with protection from the broker-dealer using customer property
for its own purposes.336 This was not enough, however, to provide
customers with adequate protection from operational risks or
fraud committed by the broker-dealer.
The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA) was
enacted in response to a series of customer securities that were
misappropriated by brokers.337 This gave the SEC the authority
335 LINKLATERS, supra note 12, at 4.
336 See Markham, supra note 61, at 108.
337 USCOURTS.GOV, SECURITY INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT (SIPA), http://www
.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/securities-inves
tor-protection-act-sipa [https://perma.cc/SJ5K-RKEM].
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to create the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC)
to provide securities customers with insurance protection.338
The SIPC is a private non-profit corporation that is funded
by assessments on broker-dealers.339 It provides each customer
with up to $500,000 for lost securities and $100,000 for lost cash
when its broker becomes insolvent.340
X. INSURANCE FOR DERIVATIVES CUSTOMERS
Professor Markham has provided a detailed history explain-
ing the reasons for adopting insurance in the securities markets
and rejecting it in the futures markets.341 His research analyzes
several U.S. government reports, and concludes that the losses
generated by FCM failures were historically so lowless than 
$10 million between 1938 to 1985that it would not be cost 
effective to introduce insurance to protect futures customers.342
Professor Markham also points out that
[s]egregation requirements under the CEA are critical to cus-
tomer protection in the commodity futures industry because
there is no insurance, such as that available for securities
customers under SIPC. There is thus a disparity of treatment
between commodity traders and securities customers.343
The failure of several large FCMs over the past decade has
raised the issue of introducing insurance, because derivatives
customers risk losing substantial sums if they are not protected
from fraud or other operational risks.344 The modern derivatives
338 Id.
339 Markham, supra note 2, at 100.
340 Professor Markham has noted that
[t]he claims of general creditors are subordinated to the claims
of the broker-dealers customers. The trustee will return all 
securities held in the name of specific customers, and it then
pools remaining securities for a pro rata distribution to cus-
tomers. In the event of a shortfall, SIPC will cover the loss up
to the $500,000/$100,000 limits.
Id. at 101.
341 Markham, supra note 61, at 6671, 99105. 
342 Markham, supra note 2, at 127.
343 Id. at 126.
344 For example, TradeStation has noted that it does not provide insurance
for futures customer margin: The funds you deposit with a futures commission
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markets operate in an electronic realm that could be adversely
affected by hacking, terrorism, rogue traders, high frequency trad-
ing, power outages, and software/hardware failures. For instance,
CME Group created a $100 million insurance fund, the Family 
Farmer and Rancher Protection Fund, to regain the confidence 
of its futures customers in response to the failure of MF Global.345
Professor Markham has noted, however, that there is a concern
that insurance may introduce moral hazards and increase costs for
customers in the form of higher fees.346 The benefits of fully pro-
tecting customers from fraud and other operational risks should
outweigh the costs of introducing mandatory insurance that is
akin to the SIPC for the protection of derivatives customers.347
This would create consistency with the level of protection
provided in the U.S. securities markets and in other jurisdictions.
As noted above, it is probable that customers would accept these
costs in exchange for additional protection.
XI. OTHER SOLUTIONS FOR PROTECTING CUSTOMER MARGIN
Some commenters have suggested using Third-Party Custodial
Accounts (TPCA) to enhance customer protection.348 A TPCA is
an agreement where a futures customer posts his or her margin
to a third-party safekeeping account held at a custodial bank
rather than posting margin directly to the FCM.349 Although
merchant for trading futures positions are not protected by insurance in the
event of the bankruptcy or insolvency of the futures commission merchant, or
in the event your funds are misappropriated. TRADESTATION, BOOKLET,
supra note 261, ¶ 2, at 2.
345 This fund protects the segregated funds of U.S. family farmers and 
ranchers who hedge their business in CME Group futures markets, and covers 
up to $25,000 per account for losses resulting from fellow customer risk, fraud,
or other operational risks. CME Group Establishes $100M Fund to Provide
AdditionalProtection for FamilyFarmers and Ranchers: Fund Launched as
InitialStepin Restoring Confidence ofMarket Users, INVESTOR.CMEGROUP.COM
(Feb. 2, 2012), http://investor.cmegroup.com/investor-relations/releasedetail.cfm
?ReleaseID=645279 [https://perma.cc/LR38-M8AW].
346 Markham, supra note 2, at 128.
347 CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton has proposed plans to create a Fu-
tures Investor and Customer Protection Corporation for the protection of fu-
tures customers. Brumfield, supra note 277, at 19.
348 Id. at 24.
349 Id. at 23.
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TPCAs are permitted for Cleared Swaps Customer Accounts, the
CFTC prohibited their use for Customer Segregated Accounts in
May 2005.350
However, TPCAs have received mixed reviews. Professor
Markham supports their use, as they would require reporting by 
the bank to the FCMs customers, telling them how much is held 
in custody for their account at the bank.351 On the other hand,
the FIA has argued that TPCAs will not increase the protection
of customer margin:
Although the Commission has stated that an FCM may agree
to maintain a third-party custodial account on behalf of a
Cleared Swaps Customer, third-party custodial accounts would
require an FCM to use its own capital to post initial margin with
a DCO on behalf of a customer. Consequently, such accounts
may adversely affect an FCMs liquidity and would impose ad-
ditional costs on customers .... [T]he Commission has empha-
sized that third-party custodial accounts do not provide any
greater protection to customers in the event that an FCM fails
when there is a shortfall in one or more Customer Accounts.352
It is argued that TPCAs, on their own, do not provide adequate
protection to customers, as they merely substitute the counter-
party risk of depositing with the FCM or the CCP for the coun-
terparty risk of a third-party custodian.353
Finally, the creation of a central fund for depositing customer
margin, a Central Customer Funds Repository, has also been 
proposed for increasing customer protection. This repository
would be similar to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation
in the securities markets.354 However, this would be an expensive
solution for protecting customer margin.
350 FUTURES INDUS. ASSN, supra note 126, at 10 n.19. TPCAs are permitted
to be used only in limited circumstances. See Amendment of Interpretation,
70 Fed. Reg. 24,768, 24,770 (May 11, 2005).
351 Markham, supra note 2, at 129.
352 FUTURES INDUS. ASSN, supra note 126, at 14.
353 COOCONNECT also notes that it is intrinsically difficult to insert a tri-
party agent into a derivatives relationship because the clearing broker is the
intermediary between the client and the clearing house. COOCONNECT, supra
note 1.
354 See Markham, supra note 2, at 129; Brumfield, supra note 277, at 28.
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XII. THE LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Canada
In Canada, the relevant laws for the futures industry are
created at the provincial level.355 For example, section 46 of the
Ontario Commodity Futures Act356 and article 72 of the Quebec
Derivatives Act357 contain provisions that mirror section 4d(a) of
the CEA. These provisions also provide protection to customers
in the form of a statutory trust.358
Part XII of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act359 provides a
bankruptcy trustee with the power to wind up an insolvent se-
curities firm (which includes a futures broker).360 Moreover, a
securities firm deals in securities, which includes commodity fu-
tures and financial futures.361 The trustee will pool futures cus-
tomer margin together with the assets of all the insolvent brokers 
futures and securities customers, and allocate any losses on a pro
rata basis.362 The claims of futures customers take priority over
the claims of the insolvent brokers other general creditors. 
Futures customers that contract with a securities firm that 
is a member of the Canadian Investor Protection Fund (CIPF)363
are covered for up to CA$1 million in insurance protection upon
the insolvency of their broker.364 This scheme, which is privately
355 This is different than the U.S. approach, where the relevant laws
are federal.
356 Commodity Futures Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.20 (Can.).
357 Derivatives Act, R.S.Q., c. I-14.01 (Can.).
358 Id. § 72; Commodity Futures Act § 46.
359 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (Can.).
360 Id. §§ 25961. 
361 Id. § 253.
362 Id. §§ 26162; see Trustees Report on Preliminary Administration, In
the Matter of the Bankruptcy of MF Global Canada Co. of the City of Toronto
in the Province of Ontario, Mar. 6, 2012, District of Ontario, Division No. 9,
Court File No. 31-456930, Estate No. 31-456930, at 11 (Can.) [hereinafter MF
Global Canada Report].
363 CIPF is a customer compensation fund. See CIPF Timeline, CIPF.CA,
http://www.cipf.ca/Public/AboutUs/HistoryofCIPF/CIPFTimeline.aspx [https://
perma.cc/EE7U-A9H6].
364 What Coverage Does CIPF Provide?, CIPF.CA, http://www.cipf.ca/Public
/CIPFCoverage/WhatCoverageDoesCIPFProvide.aspx [https://perma.cc/C9CW-3
KVP].
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funded by its members, covers losses arising from fraud, other op-
erational risks, and fellow-customer risk. For example, the major-
ity of MF Global Canadas customers were eligible to receive
CIPF insurance upon MF Globals insolvency.365 Unlike the U.S.
position, this insurance protection covers losses experienced in
futures accounts and securities accounts. It does not, however,
cover losses experienced from re-hypothecating customer securi-
ties margin.
It should also be noted that Canadian federal law currently
allows CCPs to choose the segregation model that will be used to
protect customers. This is different from the U.S. approach. This
power originates from the Payment Clearing and Settlement Act
(PCSA),366 which exempts the clearing rules of a designat[ed]367
CCP from Canadian insolvency laws.368
This is evidenced in the manual of the Canadian Depository
Clearing Corporation (CDCC), which expressly excludes the
margin of non-defaulting futures customers of an insolvent CM
from the default waterfall.369 The CDCC, however, has the power
to change its rules to incorporate the margin of non-defaulting
customers into the default waterfall.
The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) have argued
for the adoption of the LSOC Model in the cleared swaps markets
in Canada,370 and have published a Model Law that will soon be
implemented at the provincial level.371 The Model Law contains
provisions that mirror the DFA for the protection of cleared swaps
customer margin, including a sui generis statutory trust.372 In
light of the effects of the PCSA, it is unclear how this Model Law
365 MF Global Canada Report, supra note 362, at 15.
366 Payment Clearing and Settlement Act, S.C. 1996, c. 6 (Can.).
367 Id. § 4(1).
368 Id. §§ 13, 13.1.
369 CAN. DERIVATIVES CLEARING CORP., CDCC OPERATIONS MANUAL 2022 
(2015) http://www.cdcc.ca/f_rules_en/cdcc_operations_manual_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7J9D-PR3X].
370 CSA CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 7, at 4.
371 CSA StaffReport 91-304, ModelProvincial Rules Derivatives: Cus-
tomer Clearing andProtection ofCustomer CollateralandPositions, 37 OSCB
787 (Jan. 16, 2014) (Can.). This proposed Model law is in the consultation
stages at the time of writing.
372 Id.
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will interact with any conflicting CCP rules. It is also unclear
whether cleared swaps customers will be eligible for CIPF in-
surance protection.
B. The European Union
The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)373
requires CCPs operating in the European Union to provide cus-
tomers with a choice for the desired level of segregation (the
Optional Model).374 The European approach, however, would
not work under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code:
[T]he customer seeking greater collateral protection [under
the optional model] will still share in any shortfalls in customer
collateral. According to the CFTC this is because all custom-
ers transacting in the same type of contracts would be deemed
to be participants in an account class regardless of the seg-
regation model they select under the U.S. bankruptcy laws.375
The CFTC Regulations only permit margin funds to be held in
futures accounts, 30.7 accounts, and cleared swaps accounts,376
and therefore does not recognize the possibility of choosing an
individually segregated account under the Full Physical Segre-
gation Model.377 The CFTC would need to amend the definition
of account class for this to occur. Nevertheless, this is unlikely
to happen, as the CFTC Report has noted that an individually
segregated account would not provide any greater protection than
the LSOC Model.378
It should also be noted that IOSCO supports the Optional
Model. The IOSCO argues that customers should be allowed to
opt for a lower level of protection in exchange for lower fees if
the customer provides express written consent to waive these
373 Commission Regulation 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 36.
374 Id. art. 39 (5).
375 CSA CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 7, at 17.
376 17 C.F.R. § 190.01(a)(1) (2012).
377 This model requires the CM and the CCP to hold an individual account
for each customers margin deposits. Although it provides a high level of pro-
tection, it is the most expensive and administratively intensive model. CSA
CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 7, at 15.
378 Id. at 2021. 
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protections.379 To the contrary, this Article argues that custom-
ers should arguably not be allowed to choose a level of protection
lower than the LSOC Model, because that would be contrary to
the policy goal of protecting customers and could hinder the por-
tability of customer margin in a financial crisis. The Optional
Model, therefore, should not be adopted in the United States.
XIII. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
It appears that the CFTC rules are not final as of the time of
this writing. Some possible reforms may include introducing the
option for individual customer accounts, the adoption of the
LSOC Model for the futures market, a private form of insurance
akin to the SIPC for futures and swaps customer margin, more
stringent reporting requirements for FCMs and depositories, and
real-time online access to customer margin accounts for regula-
tors and CCPs.
A. Observations and Recommendations
This Article argues that the futures industry should adopt the
LSOC Model as a minimum safeguard for the protection of cus-
tomer margin from fellow customer risk. The CFTC has noted in
the context of cleared swaps contracts that LSOC provides the 
best balance between benefits and costs in order to protect mar-
ket participants and the public.380 The language used in the CEA
suggests that the legislature also intended for LSOC to be adopted
for futures customers. This is a necessary change in order to meet
the policy goal of protecting futures customers.
The change proposed in this Article, however, could have a
negative impact on the current CCP risk management models, as
they would lose an important source of emergency funding. CCPs
would no longer have access to the margin of non-defaulting
customers as a part of their default waterfall. Consequently, CCPs
may need to raise additional resources as part of their recovery
and resolution plans in order to manage risks adequately.
379 Richard Hill, IOSCO Report Proposes Principles to Protect Client Assets,
45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 247, 247 (2013).
380 CFTC REPORT, supra note 14, at 6344.
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Finally, mandatory insurance is necessary to protect customers
in the derivative markets from all other risks, because the LSOC
Model only protects against fellow customer risk. This would be
consistent with the approach in the U.S. securities markets and
in other jurisdictions.
B. Implementation ofthe ProposedChanges
The recommended changes are easy to implement. First, the
CFTC needs to publish a press release to confirm that the LSOC
Model will replace the Futures Model in the futures industry.
The CFTC must amend its regulations to clarify that FCMs need
to report on individual customer margin deposits in the Customer
Segregated Account to the CCP on a daily basis. These reporting
requirements should enable the CCP to identify individual cus-
tomer margin deposits in the account to facilitate porting and en-
sure that customer margin is returned to non-defaulting customers
upon the insolvency of their FCM.
Second, Congress needs to pass legislation that creates a Fu-
tures Investor and Customer Protection Corporation to provide
insurance to futures and cleared swaps customers. Overall, these
simple changes should bolster confidence in the U.S. derivative
markets and provide them with a competitive edge over markets
with weaker customer protections.
